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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on dictatorships. The first two study the economic
impact of power struggles in dictatorships. They focus on one mechanism used by dictators to
remain in power, shuffling, where delegates have a short and uncertain tenure in any assignment.
In these models, there is a ruler, a delegate and a population. The ruler and the delegate have
a 'type', characterizing their ability as a ruler. The population can mount an insurrection,
replacing the ruler with the delegate. The type of the ruler is known, while the type of the
delegate is unknown to the other players.
In Chapter 1, I assume that the delegate does not know his type, but can reveal it through an
investment decision. I then show that shuffling is useful politically, even though it produces an
economic cost, in that it reduces the delegate's incentive to invest, which prevents information
about his type from being revealed. I also show that the ability to shuffle has some economic
benefits, in that it assures the ruler that he can eliminate growing political threats, which
induces him to encourage some investment.
In Chapter 2, I assume that the delegate knows his type and can call for an insurrection.
I show that shuffling can ensure the ruler's survival when it is a punishment on the delegate.
With sufficiently low payoffs, even a bad type wants to replace the ruler, so that no call for
insurrection can be trusted. The same logic explains why a ruler would invest in a white
elephant project to remain in power.
In Chapter 3, I propose a general model of divide and rule. I show that a ruler maximizes
rents by playing off divisions in the population. Typically, a ruler relies on an extreme sup-
port base, who is most afraid of the alternative regime, and invests in any technology which
exacerbates popular divisions. I argue that the model offers an explanation for the negative
correlation between corruption and freedom of the media, which has been widely documented.
This explanation is consistent with widespread awareness of corruption in the population.
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Chapter 1
Political Strength and Economic
Efficiency in a Multi-Agent State
1.1 Introduction
Dictatorship has been the prevalent system of government for most of human history and is still
entrenched in many countries today. For the rulers of such regimes, the question of political
survival is particularly tricky. How does a dictator ensure that his delegates do not topple him?
What are the economic implications of this power struggle among the elite? And how does
a foreign power deal with such regimes, when it cares about the welfare of the population?
These are some of the most important questions in economic history, comparative politics and
international relations. Yet they have received little attention from game theorists.
This essay addresses such questions with the help of a simple model. It focuses on one
particular mechanism that dictators have used to discipline their delegates: the 'big shuffle' or
the 'wheel of fortune'. This is a practice whereby delegates are rotated from one function to
another, and promoted and demoted at will. It is very ancient and was used in a variety of
cases. In Mughal India, nobles were in charge of tax collection in a particular region, called
jagir, for only a short amount of time. In the Ottoman empire, cavalrymen would receive a
military fief, called timar, also for a short amount of time, and provincial governors would also
be rotated. 1
The practice was also used in more recent history.2 The most famous example may come
from the Mobutu regime in Zaire. At the top of the state hierarchy, close advisors were con-
stantly threatened to lose their privileges. Nguza Karl i Bond, for example, was chosen as
Mobutu's foreign minister in early 1972. He was arrested in 1977, tortured, tried for treason,
condemned to death, only to be released in 1978, becoming foreign minister again in 1979 and
prime minister in 1980-1. He then suddenly fled Zaire, publicly denouncing the excesses of the
regime, but was eventually readmitted into the government, being named ambassador to the
US in 1986 and subsequently foreign minister and prime minister. Many other top officials
encountered a similar fate, prompting scholars to write : 'A Second Republic ministry was a
hostel for courtiers in transit, not a baronial fief.' (Young and Turner 1985, 56). The frequent
rotation of officials also trickled down in the state hierarchy. For example, regional commis-
sioners (ie provincial governors) were shuffled annually from 1967 to 1970, and every 3 years
from then on (Young and Turner 1985, 225 and Callaghy 1984, 246).
Shuffling delegates is generally believed to prevent them from building their own support
base, protecting the ruler against a break-up of his territory or a direct coup. Consider the three
cases mentioned above. In Mughal India, although the dynasty was eventually secure in the
capital, the empire was vast and expanding, and the threat of secession was real. Ultimately,
the empire disintegrated into a series of successor states, with provinces breaking away from the
capital, led by regional nobles (in the case of the Deccan, Bengal and Awadh).3 In the Ottoman
empire, the rotation of officials prevented an alliance between nobles and peasants against
the central state, explaining the absence of peasant rebellions in the 17th century (Barkey
1991, 1994). To meet growing fiscal needs, however, the empire auctioned off lifetime tax
farming contracts, starting in 1695. Local notables rose in prominence. Ultimately, secessions
became possible, with the striking case of Muhammad Ali, who established his own dynasty
in Egypt.4 In Zaire, shortly after independence, the central state was undermined by strong
1'More precisely, in Mughal India, tenure in a jagir could vary between less than a year and 2-3 years in the
16th and early 17th century (Habib 1999, 301). In the Ottoman empire, most governors would stay between 1
and 3 years in the same province in the late 16th and early 17th century (Goyunc 2000, 523).
2For a detailed discussion, see Migdal (1988).
'See Habib (2003).
For a general review of the history of the Ottoman empire, see Quataert (2000). For more on the rise of
regional movements, in particular the secession of the province of Katanga, led by its president
Moise Tshombe (see Willame 1972, chapter 3). Mobutu, having risen to power through a coup,
needed to establish his legitimacy. He quickly reduced the number of the provinces and dealt
with the threat of rebellions and coups (notably the wars in Shaba in 1977 and 1978, and the
failed coup of 1975).
While shuffling delegates may have some political benefits, it can also hurt the economy.
With a short and uncertain tenure, delegates have little incentive to invest in the future. In
Mughal India, travelers and scholars alike described the negative effect of the jagirdari system
on growth. In a famous account, the French traveler Francois Bernier described as follows the
incentives of the jagirdar:
'Why should the neglected state of this land create uneasiness in our minds? And why
should we spend our money and time to render it fruitful? We may be deprived of it in a single
moment, and our exertions would benefit neither ourselves nor our children. Let us draw from
the soil all the money we can, though the peasant should starve or abscond, and we should
leave it, when commanded to quit, a dreary wilderness.' (Bernier 1996, 227).
Commenting on the quote above, the historian Barrington Moore suggests that although
the Frenchman may have exaggerated his case, 'there is abundant evidence to show that he put
his finger on the main defect in the Mogul polity.' (Moore 1966, 328)5 Likewise, in the Ottoman
empire, the central state's effort to maintain political prominence is believed to have restricted
economic activity (Pamuk 2004). The same argument is made about Zaire. Schatzberg (1980,
1988) argues that a short and uncertain tenure tempted regional officials to extract as. much
as they could from the territory they controlled. This prompted what he called a 'dialectic of
oppression', where agents at any layer of the state apparatus exploited their subordinates, with
dire consequences for the population. Even central authorities recognized the disastrous effect
of the big shuffle on the economy, and yet this practice persisted. 6
And so the question is: why was the shuffling of delegates practiced? If a dictator is able
to stay in power for a long period, does he not have the best incentives to promote the growth
local notables, or ayans, see McGowan (1994), Ozkaya (2000) and Mert (2000).
5 For a classic case of the negative economic impact of the jagirdari system, see Habib (1999). This position
has not reached consensus in the literature. See Marshall (2003).
6 "It is clear that frequent transfer of territorial agents and others have grave consequences both for the
territorial service and for the agents themselves and their families." (quoted in Callaghy 1984, 249).
of his economy? And as a foreign country, what policies should we adopt if we care to improve
the welfare of the population? Would abolishing the practice of shuffling necessarily benefit the
population?
To answer such questions, this paper presents a simple formal model. It is a game of
incomplete information and symmetric learning, with three sets of players: a ruler, a delegate
and a population. There is a single economic decision, which is an investment in a public
good, taken by the delegate. A delegate's success in the investment project depends on his
type, which is initially unknown by all players in the game. The type of the ruler, however,
is known, capturing the fact that he has had the opportunity to establish a reputation. The
population, observing the investment decision and investment outcome, learns about the type
of the delegate and decides whether to mount an insurrection, toppling the ruler and replacing
him with the delegate.
In this case, we conclude that a ruler's incentive to promote economic growth depends on
his strength, as measured by the cost that a population must expend to replace him. When a
ruler is strong, he is safely in power and encourages investment. When a ruler has intermediate
strength, however, he would be replaced by an insurrection if his delegate succeeds in the
investment. Therefore, the ruler shuffles any delegate who invests and poses a political threat.
This gives very low incentives for investment, and output is low as a result. The model therefore
offers a simple explanation of the fact that long-lived rulers may not have the best incentives to
encourage economic growth: success can be appropriated by a ruler's underling and threaten
the ruler. Moreover, we can show that, even if shuffling has negative economic consequences, it
is also constrained optimal. Indeed, shuffling provides the ruler with the assurance that he can
eliminate growing political threats. If the ruler could not shuffle, then he may simply reorganize
his state, leaving no discretion to his delegates. This will hurt to the population, since the bad
ruler is able to stay in power, and does so by restricting economic activity to a minimum.
With this simple model, we can draw a set of policy prescriptions, for a foreign country
that cares about the welfare of the population. First, military support is useful if it drastically
reduces the cost of insurrection. In this case, the bad ruler can easily be replaced, and a good
politician may take over the reigns of the country. If this is not possible, however, marginal
military support will weaken the ruler without leading to his replacement. In this case, the ruler
will have greater incentives to restrict economic activity so that he can stay in power. Second,
fostering an environment where politicians are more likely to be good (for example, by training
them abroad) will hurt the population if it is done on a small-scale. Likewise, allowing good
politicians to better distinguish themselves (for example, with a more decentralized system)
may actually hurt the population. In both cases, the ruler will still be strong enough that he
can stay in power and yet the increased threat will force him to restrict economic activity.
Let me say a few words about how the paper relates to the literature. It is part of a growing
literature on political struggles in weakly institutionalized polities (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003, Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier 2004, Azamrn, Bates and Biais 2005, Egorov and Sonin
2005, 2006, Padro-i-Miquel 2006, Acemoglu, Debs and Sonin 2006, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006,
Myerson 2006a, Svolik 2006, Debs 2007a,b). Egorov and Sonin (2006) highlight the important
trade-off that a ruler faces between the competence and the loyalty of his agent. Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) solve a dynamic model where a dictator faces a challenger and chooses
the optimal mix of public and private goods, depending on the size of the coalition and pool
of potential supporters (selectorate). Svolik (2006) and Myerson (2006a) focus on the moral
hazard problem of the dictator, tempted to shirk in his payment to his supporters, in a static
and dynamic game, respectively. Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) show how a dictator
can stay in power using a divide-and-rule strategy. Padro-i-Miquel (2006) adds that the dictator
can exploit his own support base in doing so, and Debs (2007a) argues that manipulation of
the media can be explained with such a logic. Parallel to this economics literature, there is a
literature in sociology and political science on patrimonial states (Weber 1968, Chehabi and
Linz 1998). Weber (1968) coins the term of 'patrimonial state' to refer to political systems
where the ruler governs the country as his personal domain. Chehabi and Linz (1998) discuss
various forms of patrimonial state and offer a good survey of cases in the 20th century.
With its focus on economic outcomes, the paper contributes to a literature on inefficient
policies (Coate and Morris 1995, McGuire and Olson 1996, Robinson 1998, Acemoglu 2005a,
2005b, 2006, Eggertsson 2005, Robinson and Torvik 2005 and Paltseva 2006). McGuire and
Olson (1996), for example, present the classic argument that long-lived rulers have the best
incentives to encourage growth, since they can earn the benefits of any increase in future
economic performance. While certainly intuitive, this results does not explain why many of the
recent dictators stayed in power for long periods of time, even as their economy was floundering.
On this note, the paper is also related to a literature on the economic impact of political
institutions, and the economic conditions for political change and stability (see Londregan and
Poole 1990, Przeworski et al. 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2006 and Acemoglu and Robinson 2006,
Jones and Olken 2005, Persson and Tabellini 2006). In particular, Jones and Olken (2005) show
that leaders have a significant impact on the growth of their economy, but suggest there is no
systematic relationship between the length of a ruler's tenure and the growth of the economy.
The following paper proposes a solution based on agency problems in dictatorship. In that
regard, it is also related to the large organizational economics literature. Aghion and Tirole
(1997) present a classic study of the optimal allocation of authority between a principal and an
agent. In the model, however, the agent cannot replace the principal. As far as we know, there
are few papers tackling directly the 'political economy' of the firm (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts
1988, Friebel and Raith 2004, Argyres and Mui 2005). The closest paper may be Friebel and
Raith (2004), which argues that hierarchical communication can help mitigate the incentives
for bad manager to hire incompetent subordinates. If a subordinate could communicate with
top executives, then he could reveal the incompetence of his manager and make a case that he
would be a better replacement.
Summing up, the main contribution of the paper, along with Debs (2007b), is to develop a
model of agency problems within the state, where the principal can be replaced by the agent,
but can also manipulate the reputation of the agent, and focuses on the economic impact of
this power struggle. The main difference with Debs (2007b) is that, in the latter, the delegate
knows his own type, wants to signal it in a cheap talk game, and the dictator tries to make this
signal uninformative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the baseline model.
Section 1.3 solves a simplified version of the model, establishing some key results. Section 1.4
solves the baseline model, establishing the comparative statics and welfare analysis. Section 1.5
discusses an efficiency rationale for shuffling. Section 1.6 concludes. Formal proofs and figures
are included in the appendix.
1.2 The Baseline Model
This is an infinitely-repeated game where, at any time t > 1, there is a ruler rt, a delegate It
and a population p. There is a single economic decision, which is an investment It in a public
good, taken by the delegate It at cost K' > 0 (where It = 1 mean that the investment does take
place, and It = 0 means that it does not). Let the quality of the public good At take two values
(At e {0, 1}), and assume that the public good takes a value of 1 if and only if the delegate
invests in the public good and is successful, where his success depends on his type q(lt). More
precisely,
1 if It = 1 andq(lt)=g
prob(At = 1)= 0 if It = 1 and q(lt) = b (1.1)
0 ifIt=0
where 0 E (0, 1). In other words, a good delegate always succeeds with the investment project,
whereas a bad delegate may fail. We let the delegate play a mixed strategy, where Pt = prob(It =
1).
Depending on the outcome of the investment, and the type of the ruler q(rt), the population,
the ruler and the delegate get a flow payoff of up(q(rt),At), ur(q(rt),At) and uj(q(rt),At)
respectively. We assume that these payoffs are weakly positive and strictly increasing in the
quality of the public good and the type of a ruler:7
Condition 1 (Monotonicity) Va E {p, r, l}
ua(q(rt), 1) > ua(q(rt), 0) _ 0 Vq(rt) (1.2)
ua(g, At) > Ua(b, At) Ž 0 VAt (1.3)
Upon observing the investment decision and outcome, the population can mount an insur-
rection. This decision is captured by the variable it e {0, 1}. it = 1 means that the population
mounts an insurrection, which we assume is successful with probability 1 and costs KP > 0.
7 In our model, a type strictly refers to a politician's ability to increase the welfare of the population. For
example, a politician may be a great speaker and an astute negotiator, but he may be unable to address the
particular needs of his population, if he cares to discover them at all. In our definition, this politician will be
'bad'.
Through an insurrection, the ruler is ousted and replaced by the delegate. Moreover, we assume
that insurrections lead to an absorbing state, where the delegate combines the functions of ruler
and delegate and is safely in power. We restrict our attention to insurrection decisions being
pure strategies.
While we do not let the ruler fight an insurrection, we allow him to shuffle the delegate
before the population can mount an insurrection. Let St E {0, 1} denote whether there is a
shuffle or not, where St = 1 means that a shuffle does take place. Upon shuffling, a delegate is
taken out of his assignment and gets a flow payoff and a continuation payoff of 0. He is replaced
by another delegate I', taken from a pool of politicians of infinite supply. Let 1 designate the
local agent after the insurrection decision. We have
S•it if St = 0
t I if St = 1
We assume that shuffling costs e > 0 to the ruler.8 We let the ruler pick a mixed strategy
st = prob(St = 1). Shuffling therefore replaces the current delegate with another unknown
politician, and may alter the insurrection decision of the population. On this note, let me say a
few words about the informational structure, the timing of the game and equilibrium concept.
1.2.1 Informational Structure
All actions in the game are observable. The type of the ruler is known, capturing the fact
that he has had a chance to establish a reputation. The type of the delegate is unknown to all
players in the game (including the delegate himself). Let the probability assessment about the
type of the delegate be written p/, with prior beliefs p(q(11) = g) = I0 E (0, 1). Write Am as
the posterior belief that a delegate is good if he has launched m consecutive projects (m > 0).
By Bayes' rule, we have
•m1 = (1.4)I' + (1 - Lo
8 This cost could come from various sources, for example any expense incurred in the transfer of duties to the
new agent. Mathematically, though, E > 0 ensures that the equilibrium of section 1.3 is unique, which simplifies
the presentation.
1.2.2 Timing of the Game
At any time t, decisions are taken as follows:
1. It decides It
2. rt implements St
3. At and ua(q(rt), At) are realized
4. p decides it
From this timing, we see that the flow payoffs are accrued before the insurrection decision.
When choosing whether to mount an insurrection, the population trades off the current cost
of insurrection against the expected future benefit of replacing the current dictator. When
choosing whether to shuffle the delegate, the ruler wants to secure his future rents, but may in
equilibrium deter the delegate from investing (since the delegate must pay the cost of investment
at step 1 and benefits from his investment only if he is not shuffled).
We assume that players discount their future payoffs by 6 and are risk-neutral. As a function
of the state of the game at the start of period t, wt = (q(rt), t(q(lt) = g)), we write the value
of the game for players (p, rt, It) as follows:
vp(wt) = up(q(rt), At) + it [-KP + 6v)(q(l4))] + (1 - it)6vp(q(rt), pi(q(l') = g)) (1.5)
Vr(wt) = ur(q(rt), At) - eSt + (1 - it)6[Stvr(q, Ito) + (1 - St)vr(q(rt), p(q(l') = g))] (1.6)
v1(wt) = -ItK' + (1 - St)ul(q(rt),At) (1.7)
+6(1 - St)[itv,(q(lt)) + (1 - it)vt(q(rt), pt(q(l') = g))]
where vi(q) is the continuation value of player a after an insurrection, when the type of the
new ruler is q.
We want to see how shuffling can help a ruler secure his hold on power, while possibly
affecting the investment decision of the delegate. Let us focus on the case where the delegate
does invests in the public good, if he is certain not to be shuffled, given the increase in his flow
payoffs. In other words,
K' < O[uj(q,1)-ujt(q, 0)] Vq (1.8)
In this sense, the investment is 'efficient' and should occur along the equilibrium path, if not
for political constraints.
1.2.3 Equilibrium Concept
We are solving for a Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, where strategies depend on history
only through the state wt = (q(rt), I(q(It) = g)), they are optimal given beliefs, and beliefs
are updated using Bayes' rule. Strategies are captured by the variables p(q(rt), 1(q(lt) = g)),
s(I, q(rt), p(q(lt) = g)), i(q(rt), IA(q(l') = g)). We add a superscript * to denote equilibrium
strategies.
1.3 A Simplified Version
Let us consider a simple version of this infinitely-repeated game. In this set-up, decisions are
taken in a single period t = 1. After this first period, players get an exogenous 'continuation
payoff' equal to va(q(r2)), which is a function of the type of the ruler at the end of the first
period. 9 We impose
0 < E < [Po + (1 -/8o]vr(b) (1.9)
K' > [/uo + (1 - po)9] [u (b, 1) - u (b, 0)] - 6(1 - Po)(1 - O)vr(b) (1.10)
vp(g) - vp(b) > /Po + (1 - o0)9 (1.11)
up(b, 1) - up(b, 0) JPo
(1.9) ensures that the ruler does not shuffle the delegate unless it is strictly profitable for
him to do so, and the cost of shuffling is not prohibitively high. (1.10) states that the delegate
does not want to invest when he is ensured of becoming the ruler by staying put. (1.11) says
9If there is an insurrection, then write v(q(r2)) = vr(q(r2)) + vl(q(r2)), since the new ruler combines the
functions of ruler and delegate.
that the benefit of having a good ruler in the continuation game is sufficiently high. l0 With
these conditions, we can show the following result:
Lemma 1 If q(r) = g, then the unique equilibrium has p*(g, Mpo) = 1, s*(I, g, o) = 0 VI,
i*(g, /') = 0 Vp'. If q(r) = b, then there is generically a unique equilibrium, with the following
strategies:
p*(b, Io) = 1 .4 K P > IpI6 [vp(g) - vp(b)] (1.12)
s*(0, b, po) = 0 (1.13)
s*(1 b, , 0 ) = 1 -t K P E (0ob[vp(g) - vp(b)], lz6[vp(g) - vp(b)]) (1.14)
i* (b, /') = 1 , K P < M'6 [vp(g) - vp (b)] (1.15)
Proof. See the appendix. 0
This lemma states that any good ruler is safely in power and encourages investment. For
a bad ruler, the incentives to encourage investment depend on his strength (see figure 1). A
strong ruler is safely in power and encourages investment. A ruler of intermediate strength,
however, will be replaced if the delegate invests in the project and is successful. Therefore, the
ruler threatens to shuffle any delegate who invests and, in equilibrium, there is no investment.
When the ruler is weak, he knows that any delegate of unknown type replaces him. Therefore,
he would like to encourage investment, hoping that it fails, which would reveal that the delegate
is bad. But if the future rents as a ruler are sufficiently high (ie (1.10) holds), then the delegate
is not willing to take such a risk, and passively waits for an insurrection.
Focusing on the welfare of the population, we reach the following conclusions (see figure 2
and remark 4 in the appendix). Given that the population cares sufficiently about having a
good ruler in the continuation game (condition 1.11 holds), then in the best-case scenario, the
bad ruler should be weak, because the population can replace him with a good delegate with
positive probability. Failing this, it would be better if the ruler were strong, since he would
feel secure enough in power to encourage investment. In this sense, we may compare these
10 (1.9) is imposed simply to ensure that there is a unique equilibrium. Relaxing (1.10) could lead to a different
equilibrium outcome when the cost of insurrection is sufficiently low. (1.11) helps us in our welfare analysis.
strong rulers to the stationary bandits of McGuire and Olson (1996), who are long-lived and
encourage investment. Note however that their incentive to encourage growth does not come
from the length of their rule -an equilibrium outcome- but from their political strength. Indeed,
rulers of intermediate strength also remain in power, but they do not want investment to take
place, because any success can be appropriated by the delegate and trigger an insurrection.
Therefore, the model offers a simple framework where long-lived rulers do not necessarily have
the best incentives to encourage growth, a conclusion which seems consistent with empirical
observations. This is a novel argument. Previous papers assume that the dictator does not
directly benefit from growth and/or do not consider power struggles within the state (Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2003, Acemoglu 2005b, 2006, Paltseva 2006).
Let us now take the comparative statics with respect to the important parameters of the
model (p'o and 0, see figures 2a and 2b). First, we note that when the ruler's strength is extreme,
the population benefits from a greater proportion of good delegates (p0): assuming that the
ruler is strong, it increases the probability that a project is successful; assuming that the ruler
is weak, it increases the probability that a good delegate comes to power. But an increase in
po can also hurt the population. If it is more likely that a delegate is good, the population is
willing to mount an insurrection for higher values of the cost of insurrection, which may force
the ruler to prevent any investment to ensure his survival.
Second, an increase in 0 benefits the population. On the one hand, it increases the proba-
bility that an investment project is successful, which directly benefits the population when the
ruler is strong and the delegate invests. On the other hand, it reduces the informational con-
tent of a successful project. Therefore, the population is less willing to mount an insurrection
after observing a successful project, and the ruler may feel safely enough in power to encourage
investment. We can speculate about the factors which determine the value of 0. It may be
lower when the set of responsibilities of the ruler and the delegate are 'more similar' or when
the investment project is more complex. Interpreted in this way, we can compare our result to
Myerson (2006b), which suggests that a system where politicians can easily reveal their type
(e.g. federalism) is beneficial to the population. In our current principal-agent model, the
delegate's ability to reveal his type is endogenous, manipulated by the principal. If delegates
can reveal their type too easily when they invest (ie 0 is low), the principal may just induce
them not to invest at all, threatening to shuffle them if they do invest.
Summing up, we obtain a variety of results in a simplified version of this game. First,
long-lived dictators do not necessarily have the best incentive to encourage economic growth.
Second, the welfare of the population is non-monotonic in the strength of a bad ruler. Note,
however, that we can get much richer results in the full dynamic game. In that case, shuffling
a delegate also affects the future strength of the ruler. In some cases, a delegate may not be an
immediate political threat, but he could slowly become one. It is interesting, therefore, to see
how this affects the ruler's incentive to shuffle delegates.
1.4 Solution of the Baseline Model
Let us now focus our attention to the full game. First, we can endogeneize the values v,(q) for
a E {p,r}. Assume that an insurrection has taken place. Given that the ruler combines the
functions of ruler and delegate, and given that the project is sufficiently productive (condition
(1.8) holds), then any ruler invests with probability one after an insurrection. In that case, we
get:
v (q) = (+ (1 - A)O)up(q, 1) + (1 - A)(1 - 9)up(q, 0) (1.16)
v( (1-6116)
v (q) = , (q) + v' 1(q), where
vr(q) =(A + (1 - A)O)ur(q, 1) + (1 - A)(1 - O)ur(q, 0) (1.17)Vrzr(q) = 16(1.17)1-6
vK(q)' + (/ + (1- -)9)uj(q, 1) + (1 - A)(1 - 9)ui(q, (1.18)0)
vrl (q) = 16(1-18)1-6
and1= 1 =q=g.
Now consider the case of a bad ruler who faces the possibility of an insurrection. Solving
the model, we impose the following conditions:
0
6> (1.19)
J o + (1 - Po)
= 0 (1.20)
K' > [po + (1 - p o)0] [ul(b, 1) - ul(b, 0)] - 6(1 - Po)(1 - O)v.r(b) (1.21)
u (b, 0) --+ 0 (1.22)
up(g, 1) - up(b, 1) -+ 0 (1 .2 3 )
up(b, 1)- up(b, 0)
ur(b, 1) - ur(b, 0)urb ) --+ 0 (1.24)
ur(b, 0)
(1.19) imposes that players are sufficiently patient. (1.20) says that shuffling is not too
costly.1 (1.21) says that the delegate will not invest if he is assured of becoming the ruler
by staying put. (1.22), on the other hand, when coupled with (1.8), ensures that the delegate
invests in the public good when he does not expect to be shuffled and remains a delegate by
staying put. (1.23) says that the population cares sufficiently about having a good ruler, as
opposed to having a high value of public good under a bad ruler. (1.24) imposes that the ruler
cares infinitely more about being in power than about having a high value of public good.12
Inspired by the solution of section 1.3, we postulate three types of equilibrium. In a first
type, the ruler encourages economic efficiency and stays in power with probability one. In a
second type, he does stay in power, but by restricting investment by the delegate. In a third
type, he is replaced with positive probability. First, we will say that the equilibrium is efficient,
and the threat of insurrection is moot if
(i) Vp _ Ao, p* (b, A) = 1, s*(1, b, A) = 0
(ii) Vp', i*(b,p') = 0
In this equilibrium, a delegate invests with probability one, even if he is believed to be
good with arbitrarily large probability, and the ruler does not shuffle him (i). In response, the
population never mounts an insurrection, no matter what are the beliefs about the delegate
(ii). With these conditions, we obtain the following lemma:
11"Remember that we assumed e > 0 simply to ensure the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the simplified
version.
12 (1.23) and (1.24) can be relaxed. They are used to simplify the presentation. The appendix provides explicit
bounds such that the results in the text go through.
Lemma 2 Any efficient equilibrium where the threat of insurrection is moot has p* (b, 0) = 0,
s*(I, b, 0) = 1 VI. Such an equilibrium exists if and only if
KP > K8 = -- [up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)] (1.25)
Proof. See the appendix. m
This lemma says that in any efficient equilibrium, the ruler searches for a good delegate.
Whenever a delegate reveals himself to be bad, he is shuffled. As a result, such delegates have
no incentive to invest, which temporarily depresses the economy. Yet shuffling bad delegates is
preferable to the ruler. Indeed, any agent of unknown type has a higher probability of success
and does not pose a political threat. And since the ruler is sufficiently patient (condition (1.19)
holds), these future gains outweigh the temporary drop in output.
Now note that this efficient equilibrium exists only if the cost of insurrection is sufficiently
high (condition (1.25) holds). The bound is determined as follows. In the efficient equilibrium,
any delegate of unknown type invests with probability one in any period. As it is more likely
that the delegate is good, it is more tempting for the population to mount an insurrection. At
the limit, mounting an insurrection produces a per-period payoff of up(g, 1), whereas staying
still produces a per-period payoff of up(b, 1). If the cost of insurrection is then too high to
warrant an insurrection, then it is never beneficial to replace the bad ruler. In that case, the
bad ruler is safely in power, does not shuffle delegates who are likely to be good, and encourages
them to invest with probability one. 13
If the cost of insurrection is not high enough, however (ie (1.25) does not hold), then the
ruler cannot safely encourage economic efficiency. Instead, he may need to shuffle any delegate
who is too likely to be good, and poses too great a political threat. We will say that an
equilibrium is such that shuffling prevents slow learning if
13We can pause to justify condition (1.22). We would like that, in this equilibrium, the delegate invests with
probability one whenever he does not expect to be shuffled in the current period and does not become a ruler
by staying put. In the simplified example, (1.8) alone is sufficient to ensure this result. In any dynamic game,
however, it is not. After any investment, the delegate reveals some information about his type. Depending
on that information, continuation payoffs may differ. For example, in this efficient equilibrium, if the delegate
reveals himself to be bad, then he will be shuffled with probability one in the next period. If he does not invest,
however he will be kept in place. Assuming (1.22), therefore, ensures that the delegate has 'nothing to lose' and
invests if he is not shuffled in the current period.
(i) B3- > 0 s.t. either p*(b, Am) = 0 or s*(1, b, pm) = 1
(ii) if 7 > 1, then V/pm, •o • Im /Lm - 1 , we have p*(b, Alm) 0 0, s*(1, b, Am) A 1.
(iii) B-• > M s.t. V/' < pm+1, i*(b, A') = 1 -/ A' = p-gm+l
In words, along the equilibrium path, the belief about a delegate's type is bounded. No del-
egate of unknown type launches more than i successful projects without being shuffled (i), but
can launch exactly m projects along the equilibrium path (ii). Moreover, the population does
not mount an insurrection along the equilibrium path, but it would if it observed a sufficiently
large number of successful projects (= + 1 > Y) (iii). Then we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Any equilibrium where shuffling prevents slow learning has Y e {0, 1}.
a)Any equilibrium with Y = 0 has p*(b,Io) = 0 and s*(1, b, Io0) > 0. Such an equilibrium
exists if and only if
6
KP > Kio = [/Io[up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)] + {1- (1- •0 )(1 - 0)}[up(b, 1)- up(b, 0)]]] (1.26)1-6
b)Any equilibrium with M = 1 has p*(b, 0) = 1 and s*(I, b, 0) = 0 VI;
p* (b, •o) = (1 - 0)(1 -0)0 1 (1.27)
po + (1 - ,o)O 1 - b[,uo + (1 - po)O]
and s*(1, b, po) e (0, 1); p*(b, pl) = 0 and s*(0, b, ,) = 1. Such an equilibrium exists if and
only if
1--_-5 (1-- 1)(1 u 0 ( - 11
K P > Ki = [up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)] + {1 - + io)]}[up(b, 1) - up(b, 0)]1 - 6 1 -6 [o + (1 - AoF &]
(1.28)
Proof. See the appendix. U
In short, this lemma states that there are two types of equilibria where shuffling prevents
slow learning. In a first case, the ruler threatens to shuffle any delegate who invests in the public
good. As a result, no delegate invests and the population does not mount an insurrection. In
a second case, the ruler actively searches for a bad delegate, and does not allow any delegate
to invest in more than one project. If the delegate is successful in period t, he poses too great
a political threat and he is shuffled with probability one in period t + 1 (s*(0, b, JL) = 1).
If the delegate is unsuccessful, he does not pose any political threat and he is kept in place
forever (s*(I, b, 0) = 0 VI). As a result, he has maximal incentives to invest in the public
good (p*(b, 0) = 1). Note also that, in this second equilibrium, shuffling is used to depress
the delegate's incentive to invest in the public good (we need s*(1, b, J0) E (0,1), so that
p*(b, Io) E (0, 1)). Indeed, if such a delegate invested with probability one, then the value of
having a new delegate would be too high, and the ruler would always shuffle delegates. But
then delegates of unknown type would have no incentive to invest, producing a contradiction.
Studying the equilibria where shuffling prevents slow learning, we note the following. First,
the ruler who does use shuffling along the equilibrium path actually provides the delegate with
the best incentives to invest. Indeed, shuffling is partly used to discard any delegate who poses
a political threat. But this requires that the delegate is able to build at least some political
support base. Therefore, it is not clear that the practice of shuffling necessarily hurts the
population (for more on this question, see section 1.5).
Second, there is no equilibrium where the delegate invests in more than a single project,
no matter how many projects would be needed to induce an insurrection (T ; 1). This
comes from an unraveling argument. 14 First, recall the observation that, in the initial state,
the delegate must be indifferent about investing in the public good (p*(b, Io) E (0, 1)) and
the ruler must be indifferent about shuffling the delegate (s*(1, b, Io) e (0, 1)). Now note
that two states can be reached from wt = (b, 1L0 ) when a delegate invests and is not shuffled:
wt+1 = (b, 0) if the delegate fails and wt+1 = (b, •t) if he is successful. Recall that the ruler gets a
maximal value with a bad delegate (vr (b, 0) > vr(b, o0)). Therefore, the ruler is indifferent about
shuffling a delegate who invests if he gets a relatively low value when the delegate is successful
(vr(b, A,) < vr(b, Ao)). This requires that the delegate does not invest with probability one in
such a state (p*(b, 1L) E (0, 1)). And again, this is optimal only if the delegate is shuffled with
a certain probability when he invests (s*(1, b, A,) E (0, 1)). Proceeding by induction, we show
that these indifference conditions must hold until the delegate reaches his maximal number
of investment projects M. But then we obtain a contradiction. As more and more successful
14Details are in the proof of the lemma, and the current paragraph may be skipped if the reader is not interested
in technical details.
projects are launched, it is more likely that the delegate is good, and that the next project
will be successful. Since these states provide the ruler with a lower payoff than if the project
failed, his value must be strictly increasing in the number of successful projects, so that he is
indifferent about shuffling the delegate. But this is impossible, since the ruler gets his minimal
value after the delegate has launched his last project.
Finally, note that such an equilibrium exists only if the cost of insurrection is of intermediate
value (either (1.26) or (1.28) holds, while (1.25) does not). What equilibrium do we obtain if
the cost of insurrection is small? Following section 1.3, we think that there is an equilibrium
where the ruler is replaced with positive probability. Formally, an equilibrium is such that the
ruler is replaced with positive probability if
(i) 3m > 0 s.t. either p*(b, m) = 0 or s*(1, b, Im) = 1
(ii) if m > 1, then VImr, I0o • m A m- 1, we have p*(b, Am) = 0 and s*(1, b, Im) # 1
(iii) V/.i' < m, i*(b, p') = 1 A • ' = Im
In words, along the equilibrium path, the belief about a delegate's type is bounded. No
delegate of unknown type launches more than m successful projects without being shuffled
(i), but can launch exactly M projects along the equilibrium path (ii). Moreover, the popula-
tion mounts an insurrection when it observes the delegate's mth successful project. With this
definition, we claim:
Lemma 4 Any equilibrium where the ruler is replaced with positive probability has m = 0 and
exists if and only if
3KP < Ki0 = 1-- [I'o[up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)] + {1 - (1 - Io)(1 - 0)}[up(b, 1) - up(b, 0)]]] (1.29)
Proof. See the appendix a
This lemma first states that in any equilibrium where the ruler is replaced with positive
probability, the population is willing to mount an insurrection simply based on its prior (m = 0).
The intuition is as follows. First assume that m > 1. Consider the ruler's decision when the
delegate of unknown type invests in his mth project. If the ruler is willing to run the risk of
being replaced, then he must strictly prefer having a bad delegate to having any new delegate
(vr(b, 0) > vr(b, po)). This again requires that the delegate does not invest with probability one
in state (b, po) (p*(b, po) e (0, 1)). And this is optimal only if the delegate is shuffled with some
probability when he invests (s*(1, b, po) E (0, 1)). But the ruler cannot be indifferent about
shuffling a delegate in state (b, o0). If he does not shuffle with probability one a delegate who
invests in his mth project, then he must strictly prefer not to shuffle a delegate who invests for
the first time (s*(1, b,7 o) = 0). In the latter case, the delegate is more likely to fail, producing
the high continuation value associated with state (b, 0). And even if he succeeds, the ruler is
not immediately replaced. Therefore, we obtain a contradiction. Also, if m = 1, then the ruler
could secure his hold on power simply by shuffling any delegate who invests, which is strictly
optimal, given that the value of staying in power is sufficiently high (condition (1.24) holds).
But if the delegate is always shuffled when he invests, then he cannot invest in equilibrium, and
the ruler cannot be replaced with positive probability, producing a contradiction. Note also
that an equilibrium where the ruler is replaced with positive probability requires that the cost
of insurrection is sufficiently low (condition (1.29) holds). We have thus characterized equilibria
for any region of the parameter space. We can now focus on population welfare.
1.4.1 Welfare Analysis
To perform any welfare analysis, we would like to know which equilibrium will be played under
which circumstances. First, we can show the following remark:
Remark 1
Kio < Kil < K,
Proof. See the appendix. n
This shows that we can nicely order the critical values of K P that we found in the previous
lemmas. Note that we rely on condition (1.23). Indeed, recall that K P = Kio is such that the
population is just indifferent about mounting an insurrection when the delegate never invests,
and K P = Kil is such that the population is just indifferent about mounting an insurrection
when the delegate invests once before being shuffled. It is not immediate that Kio < Kil. On
the one hand, observing a successful project provides more evidence that the delegate is good,
and makes it more tempting to mount an insurrection. On the other hand, the continuation
value for staying put is higher, since delegates do invest along the equilibrium path. Therefore,
in order to ensure that the insurrection constraint is tightest in the equilibrium where the
delegate invests once, we need to impose that the gains from having a good ruler are relatively
high, compared to the gains from having a high value of public good with a bad ruler (condition
(1.23) holds). For the same reason, we need to impose such a condition in order to show that
Kil < K,. With this condition, however, we obtain unique strategies along the equilibrium
path.15 Writing the value of the game for the population as vp(b, p 0), we have:
vp (b, Io)8 if KP > K8
S vp(b,7 o)ijl if KP e (Ki, Ks)v,(b, P o) =
vp(b, /po)io if K P E (Kio, Ki)
vp(b, Lo),, if KP < Kio
where
up(b, 1) - [ (1-i5)(-G)(1-2) ][up(b, 1) - up(b, 0)]
vp(b,o), = s (1.30)1-6
uP(b, L ) -+[ /zo-.( 1-)][u (b, 1) -uL(b,0)](
v(b, o) 1 (31-)1-6
vp(b, po)jo up(,0 (1.32)
vp(b, po)w = up(b, 0) - KI + 6[•ovp(g) + (1 - z0)vp(b)] (1.33)
These values are drawn in figure 3 (see remark 6 of the appendix). They show that the welfare
of the population is non-monotonic in the strength of the ruler. Ideally, the bad ruler should
be weak, so that he may be replaced by a good delegate, which is extremely valuable. 16 When
15Note that, if we relaxed condition (iii) in the definition of an equilibrium where shuffling prevents slow
learning, then we would obtain a multiplicity of equilibria. Indeed, it could be that when K P > K., any of the
equilibria of lemma 3 is played. If a delegate of unknown type has experienced a success, but expects to be
shuffled, then he will not invest. If the ruler expects the delegate not to invest after his first success if he keeps
him in place, then he prefers to shuffle him. However, the efficient equilibrium where the threat of insurrection
is moot would be Pareto-optimal for the population and the ruler.
16Note that condition (1.23) ensures that the population prefers a weak ruler to a strong ruler. The reason
why we need to impose this condition is the following. In the equilibrium where the ruler is weak, a good ruler
may come to power. This is certainly preferable to having a bad ruler who is strong. However, if the population
mounts an insurrection for a bad delegate, then the population ends up with a bad delegate forever (the new
KP e (Kio, Kil), the ruler blocks any investment and the welfare of the population reaches
its minimum. When K P e (Kil, K,), welfare is higher, since the ruler does encourage some
investment, even if he is searching for a bad delegate. Welfare increases even further when the
ruler is strong (KP > K,), in which case he encourages investment, and actively searches for a
good delegate.
Let us now take comparative statics with respect to the other two interesting parameters of
the model, po and 0. First, we have
Remark 2
vp (bp0 )8 > 0 OK= 0
MOo 0i0v (b 1i )• - 0 OK"
0 > 0Ovp(/b,Ao0to 0 > "0v ( • po -- 0   0
avp(b,to)w > 0OPo
Proof. Omitted. The results are straightforward. m
This remark says that, fixing the strength of the ruler, a greater proportion of good delegates
does not always increase the welfare of the population (the left column in the remark). When the
ruler is strong, an increase in t0 makes it more likely that the investment projects are successful,
and also shortens the search for a good delegate, both effects benefiting the population. When
the ruler has intermediate strength and m = 1, then an increase in the proportion of good
delegates hurts the population. The reason is as follows. First, an increase in Po makes it more
likely that any delegate of unknown type provides a high quality of public good. This should
directly help the population. The problem, however, is that the ruler is searching for a bad
delegate, who does not pose a political threat. If a delegate of unknown type is successful, then
he is shuffled after his success, which provides him with no incentive to invest. Therefore, the
greater is 1po, the longer is the search for a bad delegate, and the lower is the welfare of the
population. When the ruler has intermediate strength and m = 0, then there is no investment
along the equilibrium path, so that an increase in lo has no consequence. When the ruler is
ruler combines both functions and does not shuffle himself!). This is actually worse than having a bad ruler who
is strong, since this ruler shuffles any bad delegate. Therefore, the population will prefer the equilibrium where
the ruler is weak if and only if the gains from having a good ruler, compared to the gains of having a high value
of public good with a bad ruler, are relatively large (condition (1.23) holds). Note that (1.23) can be relaxed,
and the proof gives an explicit bound such that our statement holds.
weak, then an increase in the proportion of good delegates benefits the population, since it is
more likely to mount an insurrection for a good delegate.
Now consider the impact of an increase in yo on the strength of the ruler (the right column
in the remark). As a general rule, an increase in the proportion of good delegates reduces the
strength of a ruler. It is more likely that the population is willing to mount an insurrection,
even if it does not know the type of the delegate ( > 0). This benefits the population,
since it may put in power a good delegate. Also, stronger rulers are now forced to prevent any
investment, so as to ensure their political survival (,-' > 0). This hurts the population, who
otherwise benefited from some investment in the public good.
Taking comparative statics with respect to 0, we have:
Remark 3
0(b > 0 K = 0




0 (1 - bPo) - -(1 - 6 o)(1 - 6)
A( o)
Proof. See the appendix. s
This lemma states that the comparative statics with respect to 9 are particularly rich, since
0 combines two functions in the model. On the one hand, 0 determines whether the public
good takes a high value, conditional on the bad delegate investing in the project. On the
other, it represents the informational content of a successful project. Consider the comparative
statics on the welfare of the population, holding fixed the strength of the ruler (the left column
in the remark). When the ruler is strong, an increase in 9 strictly benefits the population,
since any investment is more likely to be successful. When the ruler has intermediate strength
and searches for a bad delegate (KP E (Kil, K.)), the effect of an increase in 9 is ambiguous.
On the one hand, a higher 9 increases the welfare of the population after the ruler has found
a bad delegate. On the other hand, a higher 9 makes it harder for the ruler to find a bad
delegate. It is now more likely that bad delegates are shuffled after their first project and
there are more periods where there is no investment. The net effect on the welfare of the
population is ambiguous. When the ruler has intermediate strength and prohibits investment
(KP e (Kio, Kii)), an increase in 0 certainly has no impact. When the ruler is weak (KP < Kio),
an increase in 0 strictly benefits the population, since it gets strictly higher payoffs if it mounts
an insurrection for a bad delegate.
Now consider the comparative statics on the strength of the ruler (the right column in the
remark). First, note that an increase in 9 does not affect the probability that a ruler is strong. It
does affect, however, the probability that a ruler has intermediate strength. With an increase in
0, weaker rulers can now encourage some investment and search for a bad delegate (' < 0).
The main reason is that the informational content of a successful project is now reduced, so
that the population is less willing to mount an insurrection. More specifically, recall that Kil
is the value of KP such that the population is just indifferent about mounting an insurrection,
when it observes a single successful project. As 0 increases, the population is less likely to put
a good delegate to power (- < 0), but it obtains a higher payoff, conditional on mounting an
insurrection for a bad delegate ( > 0). If the gains from having a good ruler are sufficiently
high, the former negative effect dominates, and also swamps any effect on the value of staying
put (recall that the sign of Ov (b,•ui is ambiguous). Moreover, it is clear that an increase in
0 increases the payoff of having a bad delegate come to power, and therefore makes it more
attractive to mount an insurrection, when the current ruler prevents any investment ( > 0).
Summing up, we reach the following conclusions about the welfare of the population. First,
the ideal situation for the population is that the bad ruler is weak, so that he encourages
investment and can be replaced by a good delegate. If this is not possible, then the welfare
of the population is increasing in the strength of the ruler. Also, we see that the population
may not necessarily benefit from an increase in the proportion of good delegates (PI0 ) or a more
decentralized state (where 9 is lower). In the important case where the ruler has intermediate
strength and uses shuffling to remain in power (KP e (Kil, K,)), both changes reduce the
strength of a ruler and increase the length of his search for a bad delegate, which hurt the
population.
Now that we have studied the welfare of the population under a particular regime, where
the ruler shuffles a delegate at will, we may ask the following question: what if we could prevent
the ruler from shuffling any delegate? Would the population necessarily benefit? This question
is explored in the next section.
1.5 Discussion: An Efficiency Rationale for Shuffling
Consider the following revised game. Assume that the ruler cannot shuffle the delegate in any
period, but must instead choose the organizational structure 0 of his government at the start of
the game. Let the set of possible structures be 4 = {10, 01}. Call 00 the case of 'no discretion',
where the ruler imposes It = 0 Vt. We could think of this case as a country where the ruler only
hands down menial tasks to his delegate, who cannot improve the quality of the public good.
Call 
€1 the case of 'high discretion', where the delegate is free to choose It E {0, 1} Vt. 17 In any
period, the population can still mount an insurrection. We again impose that insurrections lead
to an absorbing state, where the ruler combines the functions of ruler and delegate. Looking
at the timing of this revised game, we have:
Timing of the Revised Game
* At t= 0, r picks q E {1°, q1}
* If = 00, then the following decisions are taken at each t (t > 1): p picks it
* If 0 = q1, the following decisions are taken at each t (t > 1):
1. It picks It
2. p picks it
Let us solve this game by backward induction.
17We can think of different ways of decentralizing power. In one case, the ruler commits not to tamper with
the investment decision. In another, he increases the complexity of the projects handed out to the delegate (so
that the types are more easily distinguishable). In this section, we focus on the decision to undertake It, holding
0 fixed, while recall that, in the baseline model, we considered changes in 0, holding fixed the decision It.
The Case of No Discretion (0 = o0)
In this case, the population has a generically unique optimal strategy:
Lemma 5 Assume q = 0, then i*(b, Io) = 0 , KP > Kio
Proof. See the appendix *
In other words, either there is an insurrection in period 1 or there is never any insurrection,
since the delegate cannot invest in the public good, beliefs about his type are stationary and
the population faces the same problem in every period.
The Case of High Discretion (0 = 41)
In this case, we show the following lemma:
Lemma 6 Assume = 1. There is an equilibrium with the following strategies along the
equilibrium path:
* if KP > K.: p*(b, I) = 1 VM, i*(b, p') = 0 VIL
* if KP e (Kio, K,): Bfh(KP), 1 < M-(KP) < c0 such that Vm < Mn(KP) - 1
p*(b, pm) = 1
i*(b, ILm) = 1 r m = m'(KP)
* if KP < Kio: p*(b, po) = 0, i*(b,) po) = 1
Proof. See the appendix. *
In this equilibrium, there is a generically unique outcome. When the ruler is strong (KP >
K.), the delegate invests in any period and never triggers an insurrection. Otherwise, the
population mounts an insurrection when it is sufficiently convinced that the delegate is good
(after observing Mi(KP) consecutive successful projects when K P E (Kio, K,), or none at all
when K P < Kio). Now let us focus on the choice of organizational structure by the ruler.
The Choice of Organizational Structure
Let ¢*(4) be the optimal strategy for the ruler. We can show the following lemma:
Lemma 7 In period 0, the optimal decision by the ruler is
=1 if KP > K s
*() = if K P E (Kio, Ks)
E {0 01} if KP < Kio
Proof. See the appendix m
This lemma states that the ruler will choose high discretion if he is sufficiently strong
(KP > K,), no discretion if he has intermediate strength (KP E (Kio, Ks)) and any structure
when he is weak (KP < Kio). Certainly, if K P > Ks, the ruler can let the delegate invest without
worrying for his political survival. Therefore, he will choose high discretion. If K P E (Kio, Ks),
he will not let the delegate invest in the public good. In that case, if the delegate is free to invest,
then the ruler will be replaced with positive probability in finite time, which is extremely costly
to the ruler, who cares infinitely more about being in power than having a public good of high
quality." If K P < Kio, then the ruler is indifferent between either structure. In that case, the
population mounts an insurrection simply based on its prior, and the delegate does not invest
when ¢ = ¢1, for fear of revealing his bad type. Therefore, both organizational structures lead
to the same outcome for the ruler. Let us now study the welfare of the population.
"sThe fact that 0*(4)) = 0o VK P E (Kio,K,) is only true at the limit, where ur(b,1)-u(b,0) - 0. Fixing
ur(b,O)
ur.(b,1)-ur~b,O) ¢
u,(b,o0) > 0, there is a value of K P (call it k) such that 0*(4) = -- VKP E (R, Ks). The intuition isu(r,)-,bOo
that, fixing ,r(b,1)-Ur(b,0) > 0, there are values of K P close enough to K, that the population needs to observe
'sufficiently many' successful projects before mounting an insurrection, so that the ruler prefers high discretion
and benefit from a high value of public good for many periods.
Welfare of the Population
Write vp(b, po| *(4)) as the value of
organizational structure. We get
v(b, o ()) =
the game for the population given the ruler's optimal
if K P > Ks
if KP e (Kio, Ks)




vp(b, po 0*())w = up(b,0) - K P + 6[lMovp(g) + (1 - Mo)vp(b)] (1.36)
These values are displayed in figure 4, and show a non-monotonic relationship between the
strength of a ruler and the welfare of the population. For very low values of K P (KP < Kio),
the population mounts an insurrection. With positive probability, this leads to the rule of a
good politician, which certainly benefits the population. And even if a bad delegate comes to
power, he is at least safely in power and does invest in the public good. A ruler of intermediate
strength (KP e (Kio, Ks)) chooses the regime of no discretion, so as to ensure his political
survival. Because there is no investment in this case, the welfare of the population reaches
its minimum. When a ruler is sufficiently strong (KP > Ks), he chooses the regime of high
discretion, so that the delegate invests, and the population never mounts an insurrection. Let
us compare these values to the welfare of the population in the baseline model (which we write
vp(b, yo 10) for convenience). We conclude:
Lemma 8 Comparing welfare in 0*(4) and 0', we get:
vp(b, po|(*(D)) < vp(b, po1¢ s)
vp(b, Mo *((D)) < vp(b, pojq)
vp(b, yo|*(4)) = vp(b, 0 )
if KP > Ks
if K P E (Kil, Ks)
if KP < K i




vp(b, po (4)) s
vp(b, po (,P))i
vp(b, yo (,D)) w
Proof. See the appendix. m
This lemma states that the welfare implication of prohibiting shuffling is uniformly negative.
When the ruler is strong (KP > K,), he cannot actively search for a good delegate. When the
ruler has intermediate strength (KP E (Kio, K,)), he chooses the regime of no discretion, so
as to ensure his political survival. This strictly hurts the population if the ruler would have
otherwise allowed some investment (KP e (K2i, K,)) and leaves it indifferent if there would not
have been any investment (KP e (Kio, Ki2 )). In this sense, shuffling is socially useful, since
it gives the assurance that the ruler can eliminate a growing political threat. When the ruler
is weak (KP < Kio), the delegate does not invest, no matter what regime has been chosen by
the ruler, and the population mounts an insurrection in the first period. The population is
therefore again indifferent about the prohibition to shuffle.
1.6 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to characterize how a particular mechanism, the shuffling of
agents, can be used by an autocrat ruler to maintain his hold on power, and how this mech-
anism can have deleterious effect on growth. It concludes that shuffling is used by dictators
of intermediate strength to remain in power. Such rulers can ensure their survival by block-
ing investment, which could enhance the reputation of the delegate and undermine the ruler's
authority.
We believe that this model presents a simple framework to think about the growth experience
of many countries and empires, such as Zaire, Mughal India and the Ottoman empire, where
dictators did shuffle delegates. We also believe that it can inform our foreign policy with
current dictatorships. On this note, we reach the following conclusions about the impact of
certain measures on the welfare of the population. First, it is ideal to make a bad ruler as
weak as possible, so that he can be easily replaced. But if this is not possible, strong rulers
are actually better than rulers of intermediate strength, since they have greater incentives to
encourage economic growth. Second, fostering an environment where politicians are more likely
to be good can benefit the population. But such changes must be drastic. Otherwise, the ruler
will remain in power, and his search for bad delegates will be slower, further depressing economic
growth. Third, imposing a more decentralized system, where good delegates are more likely
to reveal their type, has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the population. Finally, we
conclude that, although the shuffling mechanism seems particularly hurtful to the population
when the ruler has intermediate strength (incentives for investment are low, bad local agents
are not shuffled, the bad ruler stays in power), it can in fact increase population welfare, since
it gives the ruler the assurance that he can eliminate growing political threats, and therefore
allows for at least some investment in the public good.
There are many natural extensions to the current model. First, we could consider the cases
where coups are mounted by a coalition of delegates. Second, we can ask what forces make it
more likely that the regime remains a dictatorship after an insurrection, as opposed to becoming
a democracy. Third, we can allow for political threats to come from outside the state. Fourth,
we can enrich the hierarchical structure of the state. These are important questions for future
research.
1.7 Appendix
Proof. (Proof of lemma 1). The proof for q(r) = g is trivial. Now assume that q(r) = b.
i*(b, i•') = 1 if and only if
-K P + 6[p'vp(g) + (1 - p')vp(b)] > 6vp(b)
-•# K P < 5p'[vp(g) - vp(b)] (1.37)
Moving up, s*(O, b, Io) = 0 if and only if
-E + 6v,(b)[1 - i*(b, o)] < b,(b)[1 - i*(b, o)
which is true by e > 0. s*(1, b, I 0) = 1 if and only if
-e + •Vr, (b)[1 - i*(b, Po)] > SVr(b){(I (Po + (1 - Po)0) [1 - i*(b, pl)] + (1 - P/o)(1 - 0)(1 - i*(b, 0))}
which gives (1.14), using (1.37) and 0 < e < 6Vr(b) [Io + (1 - 0o)0] .
Moving up, p*(b, po) = 1 if and only if
-K' + (1- s*(1, b, po)){ui(b, 0) + [po + (1 - pio)O][ui(b, 1)- ui(b, 0)]}
+(1 - s*(1, b, ,o0))6{vj(b) + i*(b, pl)[po(vr(g) + vl(g) - vi(b)) + (1 - Po)OVr(b)]}
> ui(b, 0) + 6{vi(b) + i*(b, Po)[Poo(vr(g) + vl(g) - vil(b)) + (1 - Yo)vr(b)]}
where we use s*(0, b, po) = 0, i*(b, 0) = 0 to simplify the expression.
VK P > 6•lI[vp(g) - vp(b)], s*(1, b,po) = 0, i*(b,/il) = i*(b, jipo) = 0, so
K' < [po + (1 - pio)O] [ul (b, 1) - ul (b, 0)], which is true by (1.8).
VK P E (6po0[vp(g) - vp(b)], 6Jy [vp(g) - vp(b)]), s*(1, b, Po) = 1, so that
VK P < 6yo[vp(g) - vp(b)], s*(1, b, po) = 0, i*(b, yo) = i*(b, pi) = 1, so
(1.10) holds. m
that p*(b, po)= 1 €
p*(b, po) = 0.
that p*(b, Po) = 0 €
Remark 4 The value of the game for the population is
Sup(b, 0) + [po + (1 - Po)O][up(b, 1) - up(b, 0)] + 6vp(b)up(b, ) 6vp(b)
up(b, 0) - KP + 6[tovp(g) + (1 - o)v(b)]
if KP > K
if KP e (K,K)
if KP < K
where = 6pl[vp(g) - vp(b)], K = 6po[vp(g) - vp(b)]. We note the following:
lim vp(b, yo) > lim vp(b, po) vp(g) - vp(b) > o + (1 -o)
KP-40 KP--oo up(b, 1) - up(b, 0) 6po
Ovp(b,o) > 0 if KP (K, ), v(bo) = 0 otherwise; p(bo) > 0 if KP > , vp(bo) 0
0 9 0 i (1f( Ko 0  o0 -
otherwise; o, __ > 0 < 0 -- = 0.
Proof. Obvious from lemma 1. *
Proof. (Proof of lemma 2). Let us characterize equilibrium strategies. By definition




and given that Vm > 0, p*(b, pm) = 1 and s*(1, b, pm) = 0, we have
vr (b, Ipm) > ur(b, 0) + [Pm + (1 - IPm)O] [ur(b, 1) - ur(b, 0)] + 6vr(b, Ipo) Vm > 0
Then we can show that vr(b, 0) < Vr (b, po). Assume not. Replacing in (1.38) implies
Vr(b, 0)
(1.39)
ur(b, 0) + p*(b, 0)0 [ur(b, 1) - ur(b, 0)]
1-6
ur(b, 0) + p* (b, O)[po + (1 - po)0] [ur(b, 1) - ur(b, 0)] <
Vr (b, po)
where the last inequality follows from (1.39). This produces a contradiction.
Therefore, vr(b, 0) < Vr(b, po) = s*(I, b, 0) = 1 VI =• p*(b, 0) = 0.
Moreover, Vm > 1, s*(1, b,pm-1) = 0 is optimal only if
[m-i1 + (1 - Pm-1))O]Vr(b, Pm) + (1 - pm-l)(1 - 9)vr(b, 0) _ Vr(b, po)
: r r(b, Im) > Vr (b, po0 ) = s* (0, b, pm) = 0
where we used vr(b, 0) < Vr(b, po). Also, clearly, any s*(0, b, po) E [0,1] is optimal.
Let us now characterize the conditions under which such an equilibrium exists. There is no
strictly profitable deviation from s*(1, b, pm) = 0 Vm > 0 if and only if
vr (b, po) < [Pm + (1 - Pm)O vr(b, pm+1) + (1 - Pm)(1 - ) Vr(b, O) (1.40)
Now note that given the equilibrium strategies,
ur(b, 1)
vr(bIm)= Pm +(- (1'-m)1-6
Our (b, 1) + (1 - 0) [ur(b, 0) + 6vr(b, 0)]
S1-6
1 -60
so that, clearly, vr(b, pm+) > Vr(b, Pm) Vm > 0. Therefore, Vr(b, pm+) > vr(b, po) > Vr(b, 0)
implies that (1.40) holds Vm > 0 if and only if it holds for m = 0. Using (1.41), (1.40) holds
for m = 0 if and only if
Vr(b,0) Ourr(b, 1) + (1 - 0)ur(b, 0)
v,(b, O) >_ 1-5 (1.42)
Now, p*(b, 0) = 0 and s*(0,b, 0) = 1 imply vr(b, 0) = ur(b, 0) + 6vr(b, po). Replacing in (1.41)
(1.41)
m1-6
ur (b, 1) - [(1-2) ][ur (b, 1) - ur(b, 0)]
1-6
6 [i - (liIo)(10)(1t52)]
ur(b, 1) + (1I-6 1[
1-6




which reduces to (1.19).
Moreover, there is no strictly profitable deviation from p*(b, prm) = 1 if
vi (b, plm) (1 - s* (0, b, Pm)){ u (b, 0) + Jvl (b, plm) }
where
v (b,.m) = K'+u(b, 0)+ [m + (1 - m)O][ul(b, 1) - u(b, 0)]
+6{[ipm + (1 - Ipm)0] vi(b, Im+1) + (1 - pm)(1 - 0)vi(b, 0)}
Taking ul(b, 0) --+ 0, and given that, in any equilibrium, vl(b, Pm+1) - 0, vl(b, 0) _ 0, then (1.8)
is a sufficient condition such that (1.44) holds Vm > 0.
Finally, there is no profitable deviation from i* (b, y') = 0 if and only if
-K P + 6 {ip'V (g) + (1 - p')vi (b)} • 6vp,(b, A') (1.45)
Computing the value functions for the population, we get
v(b, A { up (b, 0) + 6vp(b, po)
u(vpb,)(b, +) I)[Oup(b)(1)up(bO)+vp(b)]p' + 1 - p) [ up(b,1)+t( -O1)[u PO(b,0)+6vy(b,0)]
if p' = 0
if ALL / =m Vm
It is clear that (1.45) holds when p' = 0, since by (1.19), vp(b, 0) > vp(b). Moreover, it is clear
gives
Vr (b, tio) =
-+ r (b,0) = (1_6)_6 (1_/0)(1_)) 2 Ur(b, 0)
(1.43)
(1.44)
that if (1.45) holds for p' = Im+l, then it holds for t' = pm, since
6[vp(b, /mt+l) - vp(b, PIm)1
[+ -m], up up(b, 1) [Oup(b, 1) + (1 - 0)[up(b,O) + Jvp(b,O)]]1-6 1-60
< 6[pm+± - iml][v;(g) - vP(b)]
where we used j) < vp(g) and vp(b, 0) Ž vp(b). Therefore, (1.45) holds Vm > 0
: lim -KP + 6 {p'vp(g) + (1 - pi')vp(b)} < lim 6vp(b, /')
which is equivalent to (1.25). '-
which is equivalent to (1.25). m
Proof. (Proof of lemma 3). Let us prove part a), where T = 0. First, p*(b,po) = 0.
Assume not. Then by definition, s*(1, b, po) = 1. However, p*(b, Io) # 0 only if
-K' +0 > (1- s* (0, b, po))[ul (b, 0) + Jvt (b, po)]
which cannot hold. Second, s*(1, b, po) > 0. Indeed, there is no deviation from p*(b, po) = 0
only if
+(1 - po)(1 - 0) [ul(b, 0) + Jv1(b, 0)]} (1.46)
where vj (b, po) = {1 - s*(0, b, po)}{u (b, 0) + 6v1(b, po) } . Taking uz(b, 0) -* 0, and given that, in
any equilibrium, vi(b, pl) Ž 0, vz(b, 0) > 0, (1.46) and (1.8) imply s*(1, b, apo) > 0.
Next, let us characterize the conditions under which an equilibrium with i = 0 exists.
p*(b,po) = 0 =- vp(b,/to) = p(b,). Therefore, i*(b, po) = 0 only if
-K P + 6[povp(g) + (1 - ,o)vp(b)] < 6 up (b, 0)
S1-6
or (1.26) holds. Likewise, i*(b, 0) = 0 only if
-KP + 6v (b) 5 6vp(b, 0)
v (b, po) > -K, + (1- s*(1, b, po))I[po + (1- Po)0][ul(b, 1)+ vl(b, pl)]
(1.47)
Finally, the ruler has no deviation from s*(1, b, po) > 0 if and only if
vr(b, po) > [Mo + (1 - po)0](1 - i*(b, li))Vr(b, pL) + (1 - 0o)(1 - O)vr(b,0) (1.48)
Therefore, the strategies off the equilibrium path must be constructed such that (1.47) and
(1.48) hold. It is clear that the following completes the specification of an equilibrium: p*(b, p) =
0 Vp = po, s*(I, b, p) = 1 V(I, p) # (1, /o), i*(b, p) = 1 , p > p;N+1 where T is such that
-KP + 6[pvv(g) + (1 - p)v,(b)] > - up(b, 0) * it p i+±
Now consider part b), where T : 0. As in a), p*(b, pf) = 0, so that
vr (b, pf) = Ur (b, 0)1-6
Ur(b, 0) + 6v,(b, yo)
if s* (0, b, p/) = 0
otherwise
Now remember that
Vr (b, po) Ž ur (b, 0) + p*(b, Io)[po + (1 - 1o) 0 ][ur (b, 1) - ur(b, 0)] + 6vr(b, yo ) (1.49)
and T 7• 0 =- p*(b, po) > 0 vr(b, po) > vr(b, AT) = s*(0, b, IF) = 1.
Now let us show that p*(b,0) = 1 and s*(I,b,0) = 0 VI. s*(1, b,qt_) 5 1 is optimal only
if
vr(b, po) • [/m-1 + (1 - 0-m_ )]v•(b, pT) + (1 - ii_1)(1 - O)v r (b, 0) = r (b, po) < vr(b, 0)
where the last implication follows from Vr(b, po) > vr(b, p.). Therefore, s*(I, b, 0) = 0 VI and,
by (1.8), p*(b, 0) = 1.
Now let us show that T = 1. First, we can show the following remark







Proof. By induction. p*(b, 0) = 1 and s*(I, b, 0) = 0 VI imply
vr(b, 0) = ur(b, 0) + 0 [ur (b, 1) - utr(b, 0)]
1-6
Together with vr(b,po)
optimal if and only if
v (b, po) =
< Vr(b,0), (1.49) and (1.52) imply that p*(b,po) E (0,1), which is
-K' + (1 - s*(1,b, po)){[ Ipo + (1 - po)O][uj(b, 1) + 6vl(b, pt)]
+(1 - po)(1 - 0) [u (b, 0) + 6v (b, 0)] }
vi (b, po) = {1 - s*(0, b, po)}{ul(b, 0) + 6vl (b, po)}
By a familiar argument, taking ul(b, 0) - 0, (1.8) implies that s*(1, b, po) E (0, 1).
Next assume that 7 > 1 and (1.50) and (1.51) hold for m' e {0, ..., ý - 2}. There is no
profitable deviation from s*(1,b, pm,) E (0,1) if and only if
Vr(b, po) = [Pm' + (1 - lm,)O]Vr(b, Pm'+±) + (1 - Im,))(1 - 9)Vr(b, 0) (1.53)
which, using vr(b, [o) < vr(b, 0), implies vr(b, po) > vr(b, [Lm,+i). This further implies
p*(b, pm,+1l)[/tm,+l + (1 - Am,+1)O] < p*(b, po)[/to + (1 - po)0] (1.54)
since otherwise we get
vr(b, /m
,
+i) > ur(b, 0) + p*(b, Im,+i)[ipm,+ + (1 - ipm,+)O][ur(b, 1) - ur(b,0)] + 6vr(b, po)
> ur(b, 0) + p*(b,t Po)[to + (1 -PO)][Ur(b, 1)- ur(b, 0)] + 6Vr(b, Po) = vr(b, to)
where the equality follows from s*(1, b, po) E (0,1). A contradiction. (1.54) then implies
p*(b, Im,+±) E (0, 1), which holds only if
vl(b, /m',+1) = -K' + (1 - s*(1, b, im'+l)){[pm', + (1 - pm,+l)O][ul(b, 1) + 3v 1(b, Pm'+2)]
+(1 - /tm,+l)(1 - O)[ul(b, 0) + 6v1(b, 0)]}
(1.52)
and vl(b, tm,+i) = {1 - s*(0,b,j m,+±)}{ul(b, 0) + Jvl(b, Pm,+l)}. By (1.8) and ul(b, 0) -* 0
again, we conclude that s*(1, b, pm±'+) E (0, 1). U
Now let us show that i ;4 1. Assume 7 > 1, then (1.53) holds for at least two values,
m' = 7 - 1 and m' = m" - 1 < m - 1, so that vr(b, pm) < vr(b, 0) for m E {m",m} and
vr (b, pi) -vr (b, 0)
vr(b, pm" ) - Vr (b, 0)
Im,,-1 + (1 - Im,,-1)0
Pm_-1 + (1 - p_1)0
< 1 = vr(b, pi) > vr(b, pm,,)
which is impossible, since
vr(b, pm,,) Ž ur(b, 0) +p*(b, pm") ['m", + (1 - Im,,)O][ur(b, 1) -ur(b, 0)] + 6vr(b, /Jo)
> ur (b, 0) + 6vr(b, po) = Vr (b, yw)
Then, m = 1, (1.52) and (1.53) imply
Vr(b, p0) = ur(b, 0) + [ (1- )(1-) lur(b, 1) - ur(b, 0)t -J5Ao+(1-Ao)0]1-6
Moreover, s*(1, b, p0) E (0, 1) and the definition of vr(b, p0) imply
Vr (b, po) = ur(b, 0) + p*(b, yo) [po + (1 - po)0] [ur(b, 1) - ur (b, 0)] + 6vr(b, po)
Equating (1.55) and (1.56) gives (1.27).
Now s*(1, b, po) E (0,1) and s*(0,b, po) E [0,1] must be chosen such that
v1(b, po) = -K' + (1 - s*(1,b,/po)){[po + (1 - Po)O][ul(b, 1)+ 6v(b,1 i1 )]
+(1 - po)(1 - O)[ul (b, 0) + 6vi (b, 0)]}
v (b, yo) = {1 - s* (0, b, po) }{ul (b, 0) + 6vl (b, po) }
which admits a solution, given (1.8) and uz(b, 0) -- 0.
Let us finally characterize the condition under which such an equilibrium exists. There is
(1.55)
(1.56)
no insurrection along the equilibrium path if and only if Vi' E {0, po0, /}
-K P + 6 { p'v (g) + (1 - /')v (b)} < 6vp(b, p')
We can calculate vp(b, I') the same way that we calculated vr(b, P'). We get
v(b, ) Oup(b, 1) + (1 - 0)up(b, 0)
v,1(b, 0) = = vp' (b)
1vp(b, ) -6 up(b, ) + vp(b, o)
v,(b, pt~) = up(b, 0) + 6vy(b, /'o)
v (b, po) =
(1.57)
up(b, 0) + [1 (1 1-0)0 ][up(b, 1) - up(b, 0)]1. 1-- Ao + (1--IUo)O]J
1-6
Clearly, (1.57) holds for ji' = 0. Also, it holds for p' e {/o, t#1} if and only if it holds for /' =p,
which reduces to (1.28).
Finally, it is easy to show that the following off-the-equilibrium-path strategies complete
the specification of the equilibrium: p*(b, M) = 0 VA >_ 2, s*(I, b, [) = 1 VpA A2VI and for
(I, ) = (1,I p) , i*(b, [L') = 1 * i' _> p;+l where m is such that
-K P + 6 {jp'vp(g) + (1- p')vp(b)} I 6[up(b,0) + 6vp(b, [to)] t:i' > p m+l
Proof. (Proof of lemma 4). Let us prove, by contradiction, that m = 0. Assuming m > 1,
then S*(1,b, tm- 1) $ 1 is optimal only if
vr(b, Mo) A (1 - Im1))(1 - 9)vr(b, 0) (1.58)
so that vr(b, /to) < Vr(b, 0) and s*(I,b, 0) = 0 VI, p*(b, 0) = 1,
Vr (b,0) = ur(b, 0) + O[ur(b, 1) - Ur(b, 0)]1-6 (1.59)
Now assume m > 1. (1.58) implies
Vr(b, po) < (po + (1 - tLo)O)vr(b, L1) + (1 - Po)(1 - O)vr(b, 0) •' s*(1, b, Lto) = 0 =4 p*(b, po) = 1
where the last implication follows by a familiar argument, using (1.8) and u (b, 0) -+ 0. But
p*(b, Po) = 1 implies
Vr (b, Ipo) > u.r(b, 0) + ([to + (1 - ipo)0) [ur (b, 1) - ur(b, 0)] + 6vr(b, PIo)
which contradicts (1.58), given (1.59).
Now assume m = 1. We must have s*(1, b, po) = 0, for otherwise we get, by a familiar
argument, that p*(b, io) = 1, which contradicts (1.58), given (1.59). Then s*(1, b, /o) # 0 is
optimal if and only if
vr (b, po) = (1 - Po)(1 - 0)Vr (b, 0) (1.60)
while, by definition, s*(1, b, po) # 0 implies
Vr (b, I[o) = ur(b, 0) + p* (b, tio) (po + (1 - Io)0) [ur (b, 1) - ur (b, 0)] + 6Vr (b, po) (1.61)
Equating (1.60) and (1.61), using (1.59), gives
p*(b, yo) = (1 - o)(1 - 0)0
/o + (1 - Po)0
-
ur(b, 0)
Ur (b, 1) - Ur (b, 0)
ur(b,1)-ur(bO) ::ý IL+(1-110)0which is impossible if (1.24) holds or, more precisely, ur(b,O) -U(b (1-b,)0O
Now m = 0 =ý p*(b, po) = 0, s*(1, b, po) = 0, s*(0, b, po) E [0,1], i*(b, po) = 1, since
0 < (1 - 1o)(1 - O)vr(b, 0) • s*(1, b, Po) = 0 . p*(b, po) = 0, where the last implication follows
by definition of the equilibrium. Let us characterize the conditions under which this equilibrium
holds. p*(b, po)= 0 and i*(b,/,o) = 1 imply
vp(b, lo) = up(b, 0) - K P + 6[povp(g) + (1 - /o)vp(b)]
Therefore, i*(b, po) = 1 is optimal if and only if
-K P + 6[povp(g) + (1 - ,o)vp(b)] 6vvp(b, /-o)
or (1.29) holds. Also, p*(b, p0) = 0 is optimal if and only if
-K' + uz(b, 0) + [po + (1 - uo)O] [uj(b, 1) - ul(b, 0)]
+6[Pov'(g) + (1 - ,uo)[Ov'(b) + (1 - O)v1 (b, 0)]]
_ (1-s*(0,b,po))[uz(b,O) + 6[lovi(g) + (1-po)v(b)]]
which admits a solution if (1.21) holds.
Let us now characterize strategies off the equilibrium path. Define mi(KP), mj and KPI
such that
6pm[up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)]
1 -6[/Im + (1 - Pm)O] 4# m > mi(K
P)
K' < [bm + (1 - Mm)0] [ul (b, 1) - ul (b, 0)] - (1 - im)(1 - 0)6vir (b) * m > mn




Note that these variables are well-defined and
0 < mi(K P) < co VK P < K io0
KP' > KP" =ý- mi (K P') mi (KP") (1.65)
1 m < oo
Then, we can show that the following is the complete description of an equilibrium: p*(b, 0) = 1,
s*(I, b, 0) = 0 VI, i*(b, 0) = 0 and
if KP < KmP;
p*(b, pm) = if m < mi
otherwise
s*(I,b, IPtm) = 0 VI, m
i*(b, pm) = 1 Vm > 0
if K P > KmP
p*(b, m) =
s* (I, , Lm)= 0 VI, m
i*(b, pm) = 0 # 1 < m < mi (KP)
Strategies where (b, M) = (b, 0) are clearly optimal.
if m = 0
otherwise
Now assume KP < KPI. i*(b, Ipm) = 1 Vm > mi is optimal by definition of mi(KP) and
K P < KPi =- mi _ mi(KP). i*(b, pm) = 1 Vm < mi is optimal by K P < Kio. Moving up,
there is clearly no deviation from s*(I, b, /m) = 0 VI, m. Moving up, p*(b, I'm) = 1 '= m > mi
by definition of mj.
Now assume K P > KPn. Vm > mi(KP)- 1, i*(bpm) = 1 -=* m > mi(KP) by definition
of mi(KP). Then we can show by induction that, Vl < m < mi(KP) - 1, i*(b,7 pm) = 0 . It is
true for m = mi(KP) - 1. Now assume that i*(b, pm) = 0 for 2 < m < mi(KP) - 1, there is no
deviation from i*(b, pnm-1) = 0 if
-K P + [pm-Ilvp(g) + (1 - I'm-1)Vp(b)] < 6vp(b, pm-1) (1.66)
Now note that i*(b, Im) = 0, along with p*(b, Im) = 1, s*(1, b, Im) = 0, implies
vp(b,I'm- 1 ) Ž up(b, 0) + [pm-1 +• (1 - pm-)9][up(b, 1)- up(b, 0)]
-KP[Im-I + (1 - pm-l)0 ] + 6j{m-lvp(g) + (1 - I'm-i)vp(b)}
so that (1.66) holds if K P > ~~J-[up(g,1)- p(b,1)] which is true by m < mi(KP) - 1. Moving up,
-- 1-[rn±lIml+1-nmi)O] '
s*(I, b, pm) = 0 VI, m is clearly optimal. Moving up, there is no deviation from p*(b, Im) = 1
Vm > mi(K P) by definition of mi and K P > KPm =t mi(KP) Ž mj. Also, there is no deviation
from p*(b,#m) = 1 V1 < m < mi(KP) - 1 given (1.8) and ui(b,0) -+ 0. Finally, there is no
deviation from p*(b, Io) = 0 if
-K' + ui(b, 0) + [po + (1 - I'o)O][ul(b, 1) - utl(b, 0)]
+ 6 {[po + (1 - po)]vil(b, pl)+ (1 - po)(1 - 9)v(b, 0)}
< ui(b, 0) + 6{Iov,(g) + (1 - Io)v'(b)}
It is easy to check that this is implied by (1.21). Indeed, we only need to show that
[po + (1 - po)O]vj(b, 'l) < Pov'(g) + (1 - I'o)Ovr(b)
To see that this inequality holds, note that given equilibrium strategies,
vi(b, p/) 1 m- 6 (KP
) - 1 ]
= I _ 6 -- (-KI + u l ( b , 1)) + 6mi(KP)-1vi (g )1-6
+(1 /•1)1 - (60) m s(K P )- 1+( - ) 1 i(KP)- [-K' + Ouz(b, 1) + (1 - O)ul(b, 0)]
+(1 - AL)(50)m(KP)-l1Vir(b)
so that vi(b, p1) is strictly decreasing in mi(KP), given (1.3). Also note that mi _ 1, (1.65) and
K P > KPi =:> mi(KP) > 2. Therefore
V1(b, pl) < v1(b, zl) Imi(KP)=1 = 1vi(g) + (1 - )v(b)
=' [tto + (1 - Po)Olvi(b, Ll) < iov'(g) + (1 - po)Ov'(b)
Proof. (Proof of remark 1). With some algebra, we can show
up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)
up(b, 1) - up(b, O)
1
>/-Po
K <K, . up(g, 1) - up (b, 1)
up(b, 1) - up(b, 0)
1- [po + (1 - o)0] - -[Po + (1 - o)0]
1
1-iti
(1 - 1 ) (1-- 0)
1 - 6[Ao + (1 - Ao)•01
so that Kio < K 1il < Ks is ensured by (1.23). *
Remark 6
vp(b, po)s > vp(b, po)il > vp(b, po)io = lim vp(b, po)w
KP-+Kio
and limKp•o vp(b, po)w > vp,(b, Po), if and only if
up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)
up (b, 1) - up (b, 0)
1 [> 1 - 6[,o6yo 62)(1 - 60) -2(l o)(1 0)(1 - Ao)(1 - 0)(1 - I
Proof. The results are straightforward. To show vp(b, Po)s > vp(b, bO)il, note that
(1 - 6o)(1 - 0)(1 - 62)
(1 - )- 62(1 o)(1 _ 0) > 6(1-0
(1_ o)(1 0)(1 - 2)
(1 60) _ 2(1 _ o)(1 0)
where the second inequality is implied by 6 > as we showed in (1.4).
-Proof. (Proof of remark 3). The proofs are straightforward. Note thatin (1.43).
Proof. (Proof of remark 3). The proofs are straightforward. Note that
0 ( 1- Ao)(1 - 0)0




Nf f (0) = 026(i /co) - (20 - 1) (1 - Jpo) < 0
Note that f(0) is a quadratic function of 0, with roots
(1-6 ) - / ( 1 - ) ( 1 - )
O1 = (l_•u)
2 = (1- 6A0 )+± / (1-6)(1-56 i o)
2 6(1-to)
We have 01 e (0, 1), 02 > 1, so that v(,tO0 < 0 4=> 0 > 01 = 0. Also, with some algebra, we




Po[L.- 6[,o + (1 - Po)01
Proof. (Proof of lemma 5) Assume that i*(b, [o) = 0. Then vp(b, po) = llup(b, 0) and
i*(b, po) = 0 is optimal if and only if -KP+6[•povp(g)+(1-Iio)vp(b)] • Jvp(b,po) or KP > Kio.
Now assume that i*(b, po) = 1. Then
vp(b, Mo) = up(b, 0) - K P + 6[povp(g) + (1 - po)v'(b)]
and i*(b, Po) = 1 is optimal if and only if K P < Kio. U
Proof. (Proof of lemma 6). First assume that KP > Ks. Let us show that there is no
(1 - Ao)(1 - 0)0I 0> 1 - 6[p~o + (1 -/.Zo)O
up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)
up (b, 1) - up (b, 0)
deviation from p*(b, p) = 1 Vp, i*(b, M') = 0 V/'. Given the postulated strategies:
pmup(b, 1) + (1 - pm) [Oup(b, 1) + (1 - O)up(b, 0)]
1-6
There is no profitable deviation from i*(b, p') = 0 V/' if and only if
6
-K p + 6[PmVp(g) + (1 - Im)vp(b)] < 6vp(b, jm) > K p > 1 m
.1--
[up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)]
which is ensured by K P > Ks.
Now assume that K P < Kio. Then, by the same reasoning as in lemma 4, the following is
the complete description of an equilibrium: p*(b, 0) = 1, i*(b, 0) = 0 and
if K P < Km,
p* (b, pm) = { if m < mI
otherwise
if K P > KPm
p*(b, pm) = ifm = 0
otherwise
i*(b, pm) = 1 Vm > 0
Now assume that K P E (Kio, Ks). Define -i(KP) such that
K P  < [( m [up(g, 1) - up(b, 1)] + {1 - (1 - pm)(1 - O)}[up(b, 1) -up(b, 0)]]1-6
Mm > Mi (KP )  (1.67)
It is easy to show that
1 < -i (K P) • mi(K P) < 0o VK P
K p' > K P" =s ih (K p') > fhi(K p'')
Then we can show that the following is the complete characterization of an equilibrium:
vp(b, pm) =
i*(b, pm) = 0 #= 1 < m < mi(K P)
p*(b,O 0) = 1, i* (b, 0) = 0 and
if KP < KmI if K P > Km,
(0 if~hi(K p) •m Km I
p*(b, m) = i(KP) m < m p*(b, Pm) = 1
1 otherwise
i*(b, m) = 0 * m • ih(KP) - 1 i*(b, m) = 0 , m < mi(KP) -1
Strategies in state (b, 0) are obviously optimal.
Now assume that K P < KmP. There is no deviation from i*(b, Pm) = 1 Vm > mi by
definition of mi(KP) and KP < Kvm, which implies mi _ mi(KP). There is no deviation
from i*(b, pm) = 1 ViMi(KP) < m < mi - 1 by definition of 'i (KP). Then we can show by
induction that there is no deviation from i*(b, tm) = 0 Vm < i' (KP) - 1. First note that it
holds for m = i'I(KP) - 1 if and only if K P > fri (KP)- [up(g 1)-up(b,1)] , which is ensured
- 1- 6 [4oi(KP)-+(1-in-i(KP)-1)O'
by Mi(KP) < mi(KP). Second, assume that i*(b, pm) = 0 for m < Mi(KP) - 1. There is no
deviation from i*(b, Pm-1) = 0 if
-K P + 6[pm- 1 vp(g) + (1 - Pm-l)vp(b)] • 6v,(b, Pm-1) (1.68)
But note that since i*(b, Pm) = 0, p*(b, pm) = 1,
vp(b, m-i) Ž up(b, 0) + [Pm-1 + (1 -- pm-)O][up(b, 1) -up(b, 0)]
-KP[pm-l + (1 - Pm-i)0] + 6 {Pm-iVp(g) + (1 - Pm- 1 )v(b)}
so that (1.68) holds if K P > 6m__[up(g,1)-up(b,1)] which is ensured by m < 'i (K P) - 1 <
-- 1 6 [-_1+(1-Imi)O' I
mi(KP) - 1. Now consider p*(b, Pm). Take m > Mii(KP), then there is no deviation from
p*(b, Pm) = 1 if and only if m > mj by definition of mi. Also, there is no deviation from
p*(b,Pm) = 1 VO < m < £hi(K P) - 1 by (1.8) and u1(b,0) --+ 0.
Now assume that K P > KmP. Take m > mi(KP) - 1, then there is no deviation from
i*(b, Pm) = 1 = m > mi(KP), by definition of mi(KP). By an argument that is now familiar,
we can show by induction that i*(b, pm) = 0 for m < mi(KP)-1. Moving up, consider p*(b, pm).
There is no deviation from p*(b, pm) = 1 Vm > mi(KP) by definition of mi and the fact that
K P > KPn =4 mi(KP) > m,. Also, by (1.8) and ul(b, 0) -- 0, then there is no deviation from
p*(b,ILm) = 1 Vm < mi(KP).
Summing up, the variable M'(KP), presented in the lemma, is given by
h(KP) = i(KP) if KP < KI
mi(K P) if KP > Km,
where it is easy to show that
K P' > K P" = m'(K P') _ F>(KP") (1.69)
Proof. (Proof of lemma 7). Write vr(b, Ptol) as the value of the game to the ruler with
organizational structure q. It is straightforward to compute:
vr (b, po 1o) vr (b, ILo°) 1
KP > Ks: i ur(b, 0) +gUr(b, 0) + x
KP e (Kio, Ks) : y-ur(b, 0) _ur(b,O) + x - y
KP < Kio: ur (b, 0) ur(b, 0)
where
S(po + (1 - po)0) )[ur (b, 1)- ur(b, 0)1
1-6
6f(KP)
y = 1 -5 [Pour(b, 1) + (1 - /o)r(KP) [Our(b, 1) + (1 - 9)ur (b, 0)]]
Consider K P e (Kio, K,). To compute vr(b, PoL0 l), recall that, along the equilibrium path,
there is an insurrection after the Mn(KP)th successful project, and if a delegate is unsuccessful,
he is kept in service and invests in every period. Then if KP e (Kio, K,), q*({o 0, 01}) = q1 if
and only if
Ur(b, 1) > > +(KP) [0 (1 _- 0) O r(K P)] (1.70)
ur(b, 0) [ •(lo + (1 - to)I - (KP () -0 )0+ (KP)+1]
We can show that
i) 3K e [Kio, K,] such that K*({Po,1}) _1  > k
ii)
lim K = Ks
--+1
Indeed, i) follows from the fact that the right-hand side of (1.70) is decreasing in Mf(KP)
and (1.69). ii) is immediate. m
Proof. (Proof of lemma 8). We use the values in (1.30)-(1.33) and (1.34)-(1.36). The






















































































The Wheel of Fortune: Agency
Problems in Dictatorships
2.1 Introduction
Rulers have always had to delegate authority to implement their policies, whether it be because
of the size of the territory they control, or the complexity of the problems at hand. Delegation
saves on time and resources, but it brings its own set of problems. In particular, the ruler must
ensure that the delegate does not attempt to undermine his authority. To solve this problem,
various stratagems have been used throughout history. For example, a ruler could demand
that the relatives of aristocrats reside at the court as 'hostages' (this was the case in Imperial
Japan). Also, he could recruit officials with little autonomous power, so as to ensure that they
are dependent upon him for their authority.
This paper focuses on a particular mechanism used by a ruler to secure his agent's loyalty:
the 'big shuffle' or 'the wheel of fortune', i.e. the practice of shuffling agents from one assignment
to another. It was used, for example, in Mughal India, the Ottoman Empire and Zaire under
Mobutu. Politically, this measure appears to have been a great success. For example, the
shuffle is credited with ensuring the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, preventing
any alliance against the emperor between the nobles and the population: 'Generally, provincial
officials were assigned to a different location every three years to prevent them from acquiring
clients loyal to themselves and, by implication, disloyal to the sultan.' (Barkey 1991, 704).
While this measure may have the intended effect of undermining the rise in power of subor-
dinates, scholars have also stressed its economic drawback: a short and uncertain tenure in any
assignment increases the temptation for the agent to plunder the territory he oversees. Take the
example of the nobles of Mughal India (or jagirdars). In a famous account, Francois Bernier, a
French traveller of the mid-17th century, describes their problem as follows:
'Why should the neglected state of this land create uneasiness in our minds? And why
should we spend our money and time to render it fruitful? We may be deprived of it in a single
moment, and our exertions would benefit neither ourselves nor our children. Let us draw from
the soil all the money we can, though the peasant should starve or abscond, and we should
leave it, when commanded to quit, a dreary wilderness.' (Bernier 1996, 227).
The potential impact on the strength of the state and on development is huge. For Bernier,
the form of government caused the rapid decline of India. Barrington Moore, commenting on
the quote above, suggests that although the Frenchman may have exaggerated his case, 'there
is abundant evidence to show that he put his finger on the main defect in the Mogul polity.'
(Moore 1966, 328).
Nevertheless, evidence on the economic impact of the big shuffle is scant, and many histori-
ans have questioned the argument (For a discussion of the case of Mughal India, and the debate
surrounding its decline, see section 2.5). One objection concerns the timing of the decline. In
particular, how could the empire truly decline in the late 17th and early 18th century, when the
centralized state apparatus was still strong? In other words, how could a strong emperor, who
lived off tax revenues from all regions at any time, tolerate that agents depress the economy of
any region that was temporarily under their control?
This paper attempts to answer such a question, arguing that the ruler may himself make
inefficient decisions so as to secure his hold on power. The model is structured as follows. This
is a one-shot game of asymmetric information with three sets of players: a ruler, a delegate and
a population. The ruler picks policies which affect the productivity of the economy, directly
through his type (good or bad) and also through an investment project. The ruler also decides
whether to reconduct the delegate in his functions or 'shuffle' him to another assignment. We
assume that shuffling imposes a cost on the delegate, who gets no rent while he waits to be
reassigned.1 The delegate has private information about his type (as a potential ruler) and can
signal it to the population through a call for insurrection. The population decides whether to
respond to the call for insurrection, replacing the ruler with the delegate. We then show how
a bad ruler may decide to depress the payoff of the delegate, through shuffling, so as to remain
in power. The reasoning is as follows: by depressing the payoff of the delegate to such a point
that even a bad type wants to replace him, then no call for insurrection can be trusted by the
population and the ruler can stay in power. Extending this logic further, we show that if the
punishment of shuffling is not harsh enough, the ruler might also invest in an inefficient project,
destroying output and further reducing the payoff of the delegate so as to remain in power.
Coming back to the case of Mughal India, this model suggests a different explanation of the
empire's decline than that presented by Bernier and Moore, which is consistent with a strong
centralized state.
In this sense, the paper is related to the literature on weak states and strong states in
development (e.g. Migdal 1988, Acemoglu 2005). Migdal (1988) shows how this concern for
political control has encouraged the leaders of some recent developing countries to weaken their
own state. Among other mechanisms, he documents instances of the 'big shuffle'. Acemoglu
(2005) offers a formal model of weak states and strong states, where the 'strength' of a state is
defined as its ability to extract resources from the population (economic power) or its ability
to remain entrenched from the citizens (political power). He finds that both excessively strong
and weak states create distortions. He does not model, however, agency problems within the
state. Also, other papers outline conditions under which a ruler chooses to make an inefficient
investment decision (e.g. Coate and Morris 1995, McGuire and Olson 1996, Robinson and
Torvik 2005), but again these do not emphasize agency problems within the state. For example,
McGuire and Olson (1996) predict that 'stationary bandits' have the greatest incentives to invest
in public goods. We find it difficult to apply this argument to the case of Mughal India. Instead,
we ask whether a principal-agent set-up constitutes a better framework.
Egorov and Sonin (2006) take a first step in modeling agency problems in the state. They
show that a dictator faces a trade-off between competence and loyalty in the choice of his
1it was notorious that the process of shuffling was costly to the nobles in Mughal India. See section 2.5 for
more details.
agent. Competence, in their model, is the ability of the agent to recognize the seriousness of an
exogenous threat. In contrast, in our model, the threat of replacement is endogenous, coming
directly from the agent. It is by manipulating the incentive of the agent to overthrow him
that the dictator prevents learning about the agent's type, and can therefore stay in power.
Moreover, our paper stresses how this logic of political survival produces economic inefficiency.
The strategic manipulation of beliefs by the principal is also the main difference with Myerson
(2006b). This paper argues that a federalist democracy is particularly good at selecting types,
by first testing politicians at the local level. In the model, though, the federal government
cannot manipulate the learning process about the type of the local agents, which is the main
concern of the current paper.
In that regard, the paper is related to the growing literature on the logic of political survival
in weakly institutionalized societies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Acemoglu, Robinson and
Verdier 2004, Egorov and Sonin 2005, Myerson 2006a, Padro-i-Miquel 2006, Paltseva 2006,
Svolik 2006, Debs 2007a,b). Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) show how an autocrat
plays off divisions in the population to prevent a coordinated attack by making threats off the
equilibrium path. Padro-i-Miquel (2006) develops a model where citizens are divided along
ethnic lines, and support a corrupt ruler from their own group for fear of an even worse regime
by a strong man from another ethnic group. Debs (2007a) argues that the same logic offers
an explanation for the negative correlation between corruption and freedom of the media, an
explanation which is consistent with widespread awareness of corruption. None of these papers,
however, models agency problems within the state.2
With such a focus, the paper is also related to the huge literature on agency problems in
organizations. Aghion and Tirole (1997) present a classic study of the optimal allocation of
authority between a principal and an agent. In the model, however, the agent cannot replace the
principal. As far as we know, there are few papers tackling directly the 'political economy' of the
firm (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1988, Friebel and Raith 2004, Argyres and Mui 2005). The
2 Parallel to the economics literature on weakly institutionalized polities is a literature in sociology and political
science on patrimonialism, starting with Weber (1968). Weber (1968) coins the term of 'patrimonial state' to
refer to any type of government that is structured as an extension of the ruler's personal domain. Although the
ruler of such a state bases his authority upon personal loyalty, and may use his power arbitrarily, there are limits
to the control that he exerts upon his delegates, on whom he depends to implement policies and maintain order.
In this sense, the term 'patrimonial state' may be more appropriate to describe the Mughal state, but we use
dictatorship for simplicity.
closest paper may be Friebel and Raith (2004), which argues that hierarchical communication
can help mitigate the incentives for a bad manager to hire incompetent subordinates. If a
subordinate could communicate with top executives, then he could reveal the incompetence of
his manager and make a case that he would be a better replacement.
Summing up, the main contribution of the paper, along with Debs (2007b), is to develop a
model of agency problems within the state, where the principal can be replaced by the agent,
but can also manipulate the reputation of the agent, and focuses on the economic impact of
this power struggle. The main difference with Debs (2007b) is that the latter is a model of
symmetric learning, where information about the type of the delegate can be revealed through
the outcome of an investment decision.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the baseline model.
Section 2.3 shows how shuffling and inefficient investment can be used by the ruler to secure his
hold on power. Section 2.4 discusses the robustness of the results, allowing for side payments
to the delegate. Section 2.5 shows how the model relates to the case of Mughal India, and the
debate surrounding the empire's decline at the end of the 17th century. Section 2.6 concludes.
Formal proof of the results are in the appendix.
2.2 The Baseline Model
This is a one-shot game with three players: a ruler r, a delegate 1 and a population p. The
ruler picks a set of economic policies. First, he makes an investment decision I e {0, 1} which
determines the value of public infrastructure A' (formally, A' = I). Investment I comes at cost
IK' to the ruler. Second, he makes a number of decisions, which are not explicitly modeled,
but which affect the economy through his type q(r), either good or bad (formally, q(r) E {g, b},
where g stands for good and b for bad). Depending on the value of the public infrastructure
A' and the type of the ruler at the end of the game, q(r'), any player a receives a payoff
va(q(r'),A') > 0, for a E {r,1,p}.
Characterizing these payoffs, we assume first that a good ruler produces higher payoffs to
all players in the game, for any value of public good:
Condition 2 (Monotonicity)
va(g, A') > va(b, A') VA'Va E {r, 1, p} (2.1)
Second, we restrict attention to two types of projects: productive if
va(q(r'), 1) > va(q(r'), 0) Vq(r')Va
and unproductive (or white elephant) if
va(q(r'), 1) < va(q(r'), 0) Vq(r')Va
One of our main objectives is to understand how the ruler's struggle for political survival can
produce economic inefficiency. As we shall see, we will obtain similar conditions, whether a
project is productive or unproductive. Finally, we assume that the delegate's payoff is suffi-
ciently dependent on the value of public infrastructure, relative to the ruler's payoff:
Condition 3 (Relative Dependence of the Delegate): 3a E (0, 1) such that
a Iv (b, 1)- vi (b,0)l > Ivy (b, 1)- vr, (b, 0) (2.2)
This holds, for example, if the delegate's payoff depends largely on taxes on output, while
the ruler's payoff depends mostly on certain rents from holding office, which are independent
of the productivity of the economy.
We also assume that the delegate has a type, q(1) e {g, b}, and that the population sees
him as a potential replacement to the ruler.3 Given condition 2, the population would want to
replace a bad ruler with a good delegate, if types were observable. However, we assume that
the type of a delegate is unknown, since he has not had the opportunity to prove his worth as
a ruler, while the type of the ruler is known. Let the probability assessment about the type
of the delegate be written t, and assume that prior beliefs are that the delegate is good with
3The fact that the payoffs specified above do not directly depend on the type of the delegate does not mean
that he serves no economic function. For example, it could be that the tasks handled by the delegate do not
require any skill, or that the skills of a good ruler are unrelated to the skills of a good delegate.
probability /o, i.e. p(q(1) = g) = p0 E (0, 1). Even if the delegate's type is unknown, we let him
send a signal to the population, calling for an insurrection. Formally, let there be a signaling
game, where the delegate sends a signal c E {0, 1} and c = 1 is a call for insurrection, and the
population picks a decision i E {0, 1}, where i = 1 denotes an insurrection. Any insurrection
costs K P to the population and Kc to the delegate. We assume that Kc is not too large, relative
to the value of being a ruler:
Kc < v, (q(r'), A') Vq(r')VA' (2.3)
Any insurrection is always successful and leads to the replacement of the ruler by the delegate.
Any unanswered call for insurrection leads to the death of the delegate, who gets a payoff of 0.
We assume that the ruler cannot fight an insurrection. However, he can shuffle delegates
conditional on staying in power.4 Let S E {0, 1} denote whether there is a shuffle or not, where
S = 1 means that a shuffle does take place. When a shuffle takes place, the delegate in function
and a delegate waiting for assignment switch responsibilities. Let (1', 1',) be the configuration
of delegates at the end of the period, when there is no insurrection (i - 0). 5 We have:
t )= (1, lW) if S = 0(l',l) (lw, l1) if S = 1
The crucial aspect of shuffling that we want to focus on here is that it is a punishment. In
other words, upon shuffling, a delegate gets a payoff of vj (q(r'), A'), where
vis (q(r'), A') = /yv (q(r'), A') Vq(r')VA' (2.4)
and -y e (a, 1). This is true, for example, if the delegate earns rents only when he is actively
in function, and there is some loss in waiting for reassignment. On the other hand, we assume
that shuffling is costless to the ruler. This would hold if, during a shuffle, the transfer of power
4We exclude any possible repression on the part of the ruler so as to isolate the role of shuffling. In section
2.4, we also allow the ruler to bribe the delegate through a side payment, and show that the logic of the basic
model still holds.
5To close the model, we will assume that, if i = 1, the new ruler picks a new delegate to be in function and
another to be waiting for assignment.
between delegates can be made smoothly. We let the ruler pick a mixed strategy s = prob(S =
1).
Let us make the timing of the game more explicit and introduce our solution concept.
2.2.1 Timing of the Game
Decisions are taken as follows:6
1. r implements I and announces s
2. 1 decides c
3. p decides i
4. if i = 0, then s is implemented
5. va(q(r'), A') is realized
Players (r, 1, p) are risk-neutral and receive the following value in the game:7
vr = -IK' + (1 - i)vr(q(r), I)
vi = i[-Kc + vr(q(l), I)] + (1 - i)(1 - c)[Svj,(q(r),I) + (1 - S)vl(q(r), I)]





We are solving for a Perfect-Bayesian Equilibrium, where strategies are optimal given beliefs,
and beliefs are updated using Bayes' rule. We add a superscript * to denote equilibrium
strategies. Finally, because of the multiplicity of equilibria in signaling games, we will restrict
attention to equilibria that survive the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).
6 The fact that the ruler announces s in step 1 is done to obtain a unique equilibrium outcome. It will be easy
to see that there is no strictly profitable deviation from any choice of s in step 4.
7We omit to write the payoff of l1, since he does not take any decision.
2.3 Solution of the Baseline Model
We are interested in the case where a ruler, known to be bad, wants to secure his hold on
power, and where the population wants to revolt against the bad ruler only if it is convinced
that the delegate is good. Solving the game backwards, we first consider the signaling game,
where the delegate sends a signal c and the population answers by an insurrection decision i.
We can show that this signaling game has a generically unique equilibrium, when we impose
the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Formally:
Lemma 9 Fix any strategy s, I and assume that
K e (po[vp(g,I) - vp(b,I)], [vp(g,I) - vp(b,I)]) (2.8)
a) A separating equilibrium, where c = 1 * q(l) = g and i = 1 c* c = 1, exists if and only if
svj (b, I) + (1 - s)vi(b, I) E [-Kc + vr(b, I), -Kc + vr(g, I)] (2.9)
b) A pooling equilibrium, where c = 0 Vq(l) and i = 0 Vc, supported by appropriate off-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs, survives the Intuitive Criterion if and only if
svi•W(b, I) + (1 - s)vl(b, I) V (-K c + vr(b, I), -Kc + vr(g, I)) (2.10)
Proof. See the appendix. 0
This lemma states that the Intuitive Criterion eliminates pooling equilibria which rely on
unappealing off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. By condition (2.8), in any pooling equilibrium,
the population must believe sufficiently strongly that a delegate who calls for an insurrection is
bad. Yet consider the case where only the good delegate strictly prefers to mount a successful
insurrection ((2.10) does not hold). In that case, by the Intuitive Criterion, the population
should put no weight on the event that the delegate who calls for an insurrection is bad.
Therefore, any pooling equilibrium is ruled out.
Lemma 9 then suggests that a bad ruler may secure his hold on power by punishing a loyal
delegate. Let us consider the case where the informational problem is sufficiently important
that the population wants to mount an insurrection only if it is convinced that the delegate is
good:
K P E (po max[vp(g,I) - vp(b,I)],n min[vp(g,I) - vp(b,I)]) (2.11)I I
Let us define the unconstrained optimal level of investment, IU, as the decision that maximizes
the ruler's payoff, assuming that he remains in power with probability one:
IU = argmax-IKI + vr(b,I) (2.12)
I
It is clear that, if the project is unproductive, IU = 0; and let us assume that, if the project is
productive, I v = 1. Also assume that
vi (b, IU) E (-Kc + vr (b, IU), -K c + vr(g, IU)) (2.13)
so that, if the ruler does not shuffle the delegate and picks the optimal level of investment, then
no pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion. In this case, one way for the ruler to
secure his hold on power is by reducing the delegate's payoff, either through shuffling (which
acts as a punishment) or inefficient investment. Let us see how this works.
2.3.1 Political Survival Through Private Punishment
Consider first the case where, even with efficient investment, the bad delegate would prefer to
mount an insurrection if the shuffling probability is sufficiently high;
viW (b, IU) < -K c + Vr (b, IU) (2.14)
Then we can show the following lemma:
Lemma 10 Any equilibrium has shuffling with positive probability, efficient investment and no
insurrection along the equilibrium path.
Proof. See the appendix. E
This lemma says that the ruler can still pick the first best level of investment with sufficient
shuffling. When the bad delegate expects sufficiently low payoffs in the regime of the ruler, he
too would like to replace the ruler. In that case, calls for insurrection become uninformative,
and the ruler can stay in power.
This lemma therefore shows that a ruler may stay in power by imposing a private punishment
on the delegate. However, it is also possible that a ruler would pick an inefficient policy so as
to remain in power. We explore this possibility in the next section.
2.3.2 Political Survival Through Public Inefficiency
Assume that the punishment of shuffling is not harsh enough. More precisely, let
vr (b, IU ) > -Kc + vr(b, IU) (2.15)
While shuffling cannot ensure the political survival of the ruler, inefficient investment could do
so, if,
max[-Kc + vr(b,I) - v1 (b,I)] > 0 (2.16)
I
Let us assume that the ruler cares sufficiently about being in power that he would like to enforce
the pooling equilibrium, even if it comes at the cost of inefficient investment:
min -IK' + vr(b, I) > max -IK' + (1 - Mo)vr(b, I) (2.17)
I I
Then we can show the following lemma:
Lemma 11 Any equilibrium has shuffling wuith positive probability, inefficient investment and
no insurrection along the equilibrium path.
Proof. See the appendix. U
This lemma shows that the ruler will obtain the pooling equilibrium through a combination
of shuffling and inefficient investment. In particular, the ruler is willing to invest in a project
even if it is unproductive, i.e. he may spend resources to destroy output because, in this case,
even the bad delegate wants to replace him, and any call for insurrection becomes uninformative.
8Note that condition 3 is necessary for (2.15) and (2.16) to be compatible.
2.4 Robustness of the Results
The results presented so far suggest a particular way in which the ruler enforces the pooling
equilibrium: by depressing the payoff of the delegate, so that even the bad type wants to replace
him. With this logic, the ruler might want to make an inefficient investment decision, as we
saw in lemma 11.
Intuitively, we may expect the ruler to enforce a pooling equilibrium by increasing the payoff
of the delegate, so that even the good type does not want to replace him, and the ruler can still
take the efficient investment decision. Let us consider the case where the ruler can offer a side
payment 7r, bribing good delegates not to call for an insurrection. As we will see, although this
method is intuitively appealing, it assumes a strong ability to commit, either on the part of the
ruler (if the payment is made after the insurrection decision) or on the part of the delegate (if
the payment is made before the insurrection decision).
Let us consider the case of section 2.3.2, where conditions (2.11), (2.13), (2.15), (2.16) and
(2.17) hold. Now allow the ruler to offer a side payment x, and consider first the case where
this payment is to be made after the insurrection decision. In other words, the revised timing
is
1. r implements I and announces (s, x)
2. 1 decides c
3. p decides i
4. if i = 0, then (s, x) is implemented
5. va(q(r'), A') is realized
The revised game produces the following value for the ruler and the delegate:
vr = -IK' + (1 - i)[vr(q(r), I) - 7r] (2.18)
v1 = i[-Kc + Vr(q(1), I)] + (1 - i)(1 - c)[{Svi,(q(r), I) + (1 - S)vj(q(r), I)} + 7r] (2.19)
Then we can rewrite lemma 9 as follows
Lemma 12 Fix any strategy s, I, 7r and assume that
K P e (p o[vp(g,I) - vp(b,I)], vp(g,I) - vp(b,I)) (2.20)
a) A separating equilibrium, where c = 1 # q(l) = g and i = 1 =* c = 1, exists if and only if
svi (b, I) + (1 - s)vt (b, I) + 7r E [-K c + vr(b, I), -Kc + vr(g, I)] (2.21)
b) A pooling equilibrium, where c = 0 Vq(l) and i = 0 Vc, supported by appropriate off-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs, survives the Intuitive Criterion if and only if
svi (b,I) + (1 - s)vl(b,I) + 7r (-Kc + vr(b,I),-K c + Vr(g, I)) (2.22)
Proof. Omitted. m
Therefore, it is conceivable that the ruler would refrain from shuffling the delegate (s = 0)
and offer a payment
S= -Kc + vr (g, IU) - v (b, IU) (2.23)
so that the good delegate is indifferent about calling for an insurrection, when the efficient
investment decision is made. The ruler would prefer to do so if
-IUK I + vr(b, IU) - (-Kc + vr(g, IU) - vi(b, IU)) (2.24)
> -I'K' + vr(b, I')
where I' $ IU. The problem, however, is that this promise of payment requires commitment
power on the part of the ruler. If he could revise his decision at the time of making the payment
(step 4 of the revised timing), then he would prefer to renege on his promise, since the threat
of insurrection is already averted. Therefore, any equilibrium where side payments are offered
after the threat of insurrection is fragile. 9
9 On the other hand, the promise to shuffle the delegate is credible, since it is costless to the ruler and the
payoff v,(b, I) does not depend on the type of the delegate.
Let us now allow the ruler to offer a payment that would be paid before the insurrection
decision is made, and the delegate decides whether to take the payment (captured by the variable
t E {0, 1}, where t = 1 means that the delegate takes the payment. Again, for simplicity, we
are solving for equilibria where t is a pure strategy, and we assume that t is observable to the
population, as we did for all other strategies.) The revised timing is:
1. r implements I and announces (s, 7r)
2. I decides (c, t)
3. p decides i
4. if i = 0, then s is implemented
5. va(q(r'), A') is realized
The revised game produces the following value for the ruler and the delegate:
Vr = -IK' - tir + (1 - i)vr(q(r), I) (2.25)
v = tr + i[-Kc + vr(q(1), I)] + (1 - i)(1 - c) [Svlw(q(r), I) + (1 - S)v(q(r), I)] (2.26)
The idea is that the ruler could bribe the delegate not to call for an insurrection. In that case,
the ruler could implement the efficient level of investment and offer a payment to the delegate
as defined in (2.23). Again, condition (2.24) would determine whether the ruler prefers such
a strategy to that outlined in the basic model. The problem, however, is that we have now
replaced a commitment problem on the part of the ruler by a commitment problem on the part
of the delegate, since the side payment is already cashed in, and continuation payoffs are such
that only a good delegate wants to replace the ruler, when (s, I) = (0, IU) (see lemma 13 in the
appendix).
Let us see how this model can shed light on a particular historical example, as we survey
the debate surrounding the decline of the Mughal empire.
2.5 The Case of Mughal India
The Mughal empire was founded with the early victories of Babur in 1526 and came to dom-
inate almost the entire Indian subcontinent for about 200 years. During that time, with a
highly centralized government, it accumulated military victories, controlled a highly monetized
economy, and constructed many historical landmarks, the most famous of which being arguably
the Taj Mahal. The degree of centralization of the government was particularly striking and
historians see in the decay of that structure - more than in the end of the dynasty itself - the
collapse of the empire.10 What exactly, then, was the nature of the Mughal administration
system, and what role did it play in the success - and collapse - of the empire?
2.5.1 A Description
The Mughal administration was set up during the reign of Akbar (1556-1605) and remained
virtually unchanged until the end of the reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707).11 At the center of
the structure stood the emperor, who devised policies with the advice of his ministers. 12 The
emperor also relied on nobles to participate in the imperial army and, in return, he let them
extract revenue on a given territory. The extent of the territory controlled by any noble was
determined by his rank (mansab), with the value of a region being assessed by imperial officers,
allowing for variations in agricultural yields (this constituted the zabt system). 13 The main
source of tax revenue came from a tax on agricultural produce. The empire regulated the
maximal share that the nobles could extract, with the limit set as high as one-half of output.
In order to regulate the power of the nobles, a number of measures were taken. As a general
rule, assignments (or jagirs) were allocated to a noble (or jagirdar, as in holder of the jagir) only
for a short amount of time. 14 This practice of rotating agents was a true innovation of Akbar.
1oFor example, Richards (1995) chooses 1719 as the time of the collapse, since by then the centralized structure
of the empire was disintegrated beyond repair, even though the Mughal dynasty was still in power (1719 marks
the accession to the throne of Muhammad Shah).
"
1 This section is based on Richards (1995), especially chapters 3, 4, Habib (1999), especially chapters VI and
VII, Athar Ali (1997) and Majumdar (1973).
12They were the Diwan, Mir Bakhshi, Khan-i-Saman and Sadr, who were responsible, respectively, for finance
and revenue; army and intelligence; public works, including the royal household; and judiciary and religious
patronage.
13 A noble's rank in effect constituted of two numbers: the zat which determined the noble's personal pay, and
the sawar which determined the military contingent which the noble had to maintain.
14Habib (1999) estimates that, under Shah Jahan, around Agra, tenures averaged 2.7 years. For more distant
Its expressed aim was to prevent nobles from developing their own political support base. Many
examples of the period showed the danger of disintegration of an empire. For example, prior
to the Mughals, in southern India, the Bahmani kingdom suffered from the secession of the
provinces of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Berar (in 1490) and Golconda (in 1518) (see Majumdar
1973, chapter XIV). During the last years of Aurangzeb's reign, a noble named Riza Khan was
able to set up a parallel government from the town of Ramgir in the Deccan (see Bhadra 1998,
496-499). An important feature of the shuffling mechanism was that it acted as a punishment
on the delegate. Between assignments, nobles had to wait at the court, earning no income. This
problem was particularly acute in the later period of the empire, when there was an increasing
imbalance between the number of nobles and the number of territories available (a jagirdari
crisis).15
While transfers were costly to the delegate, the emperor built an elaborate system to smooth
out transitions, minimizing the cost to the emperor, and also monitor the jagirdars. A number
of agents served the emperor in any region and were not affected by the transfers. There was a
qanungo, or an accountant helping with tax assessment; and a chaudhuri, who helped with tax
collection. Also, each area contained a diwan, or head of revenue, who could report misdeeds
to the emperor; a faujdar or imperial police, who was in charge of maintaining law and order,
and could help with tax collection; and some waqi'a-navis or sawanih-nigar, i.e. news reporters
with the duty of reporting cases of irregularities and oppression to the emperor (Habib 1999,
331-340).
As mentioned, the system remained intact until the end of Aurangzeb's reign, during which
time the empire was apparently prosperous and the nobility respectful of the authority of the
emperor. However, signs of decline had already started to appear, as noted by historians and
contemporary observers (e.g. Richards 1995, 252 and Athar Ali 1997, 91). Shortly after, the
areas, the figures were as follows: 1.7 years for Bhakkar (Multan province) between 1574-90; 2.6 years for Sehwan
(Sind) between 1592-1634; 3.3 years for Dahr (Malwa) between 1653-85; 3.5 years for Indur (Telangana) between
1631-58 (Habib 1999, 301-302). Note, though, that there were exceptions to the rotation system. Some lands,
called watan-jagirs, were assigned permanently to an individual and his heirs. These were usually the dominions
of local lords (zamindars) before these were incorporated in the state apparatus. Also, a portion of the territory
(called khalisa) remained under the direct control of the emperor. The division of the lands between khalisa and
jagirs fluctuated between the time of Akbar and Aurangzeb; but it seems that no less than four-fifths of total
revenues were granted as jagirs (Athar Ali 1997, 74).
15The number of jagirdars grew, in part, because of the increased military commitment in the Deccan and the
absorption of rebellious Marathas in the administration. See Athar Ali (1997) and Habib (1999), 311-312.
empire would disintegrate into a series of successor states, with provinces breaking away from
the capital, some of them being led by regional jagirdars (in the case of the Deccan, Bengal
and Awadh; see Habib 2003). Was the jagirdari system in any way responsible for this decline?
Did the centralized system contain the seeds of its own decline?
2.5.2 A Debate
In a seminal book, Irfan Habib, of Aligarh university, suggests that part of the decline of the
empire resulted from the oppressiveness of the jagirdari system (see Habib 1999, chapter IX).16
Following Bernier and other historians, Habib argues that the jagirdari system was hurtful to
growth. Quite simply, the interests of the jagirdars clashed with those of the emperor. While
the latter cared for long-term development, nobles were very short-sighted, and preferred to
extract as much as possible from the region they controlled.
The thesis has been influential for many years, and many other theories have followed,
sometimes strengthening the basic story, sometimes criticizing its focus, or even attacking
its basic premise. For example, Athar Ali (1997), who documents the jagirdari crisis in the
late Aurangzeb, raises some doubts about Habib's thesis. He is puzzled by one aspect of the
argument. The central state was still strong during Aurangzeb's time, so how could a strong
emperor tolerate excessive levels of taxation? In the same vein, Richards (1995) rejects Habib's
explanation, arguing that the economy declined even if the political structure of the empire was
still functional. Also, Clingingsmith and Williamson (2005) doubt that a strong centralized
state was deleterious to growth. 17 Another group of scholars has gone further in their criticism
of Habib's thesis. Some of these 'revisionists' challenge the idea that India was declining in the
early 18th century (Bayly 1983) and reject the image of a strong and centralized state, arguing
that the thesis overshadows regional differences in imperial administration, and the efforts of
local lords to build their own political support base (Alam 1986).
This paper does not aim to settle the debate between the Aligarh school and the revisionists,
16The survey represents, from our understanding of the literature, the main hypotheses on the decline of
Mughal India. For alternative theories, see Pearson (1976) and Leonard (1979).17They argue that the decline of the Mughal economy was caused by a variety of factors. As concerns the
political economy of the empire, they argue that the centralization of the state was good for growth (ensuring law
and order, etc.) and see rather the disintegration of the empire into warring states as a cause for the economic
decline. Their newly compiled dataset, however, goes only as far back as 1765.
on whether the economy was declining and taxes were excessive in the late 17th and early
18th century. What the paper offers is a missing link in the argument of the Aligarh school,
and a potential answer to Athar Ali's question. Even though an emperor cares for long-term
development and controls a centralized state, he may have an incentive to depress the economy,
even by launching unproductive (white elephant) projects, since it is precisely with such an
instrument that he extends his hold on power. When the nobles under his command get
sufficiently low payoffs, then they would all prefer to break free from his rule. In that case, the
population may not be able to trust any call for insurrection, and the ruler can maintain his
hold on power.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of agency problems in dictatorships. It focuses on the case of
a ruler struggling to maintain his hold on power, when a delegate can build his own support
base and undermine his authority. It concludes that a ruler may have an incentive to depress
the delegate's payoff to remain in power. With relatively low payoffs, even the bad delegate
wants to replace him. In that case, why should the population trust a delegate who calls for
insurrection, as he may be just as inefficient as the current ruler?
We show that the ruler may use various tools to depress the delegate's payoff. One is the
'big shuffle', with delegates being rotated from one assignment to another, and losing rent in
the process. This is a mechanism which imposes a purely private cost on the delegate. Other
tools, however, generate public inefficiencies, e.g. investing in white elephant projects. In that
sense, the paper contributes to the debate on whether (and how) Mughal India declined in the
late 17th and early 18th century. It strengthens the case of those who believe that the empire
did decline, even when the central state apparatus was still strong.
Certainly, the paper focuses on one mechanism (shuffling) and on one aspect of such a
mechanism (that it acts as a punishment) to explain how a ruler can stay in power. We may
think that shuffling operates through a different mechanism. For example, it could be that the
type of the delegate, although initially unknown to all, directly matters for output, and can
be revealed through a successful investment project. In that case, a bad ruler may shuffle the
delegate so as to depress his incentive to invest. As a result, there would be no information on
the delegate's type, and the ruler would be able to stay in power. This possibility is explored
in Debs (2007b). Finally, it may be that the real threat to the ruler comes from a coalition
of delegates, and shuffling prevents them from forming a coalition. It would be interesting to
understand this mechanism and its impact, if any, on economic efficiency.
2.7 Appendix
Proof. (Proof of lemma 9). Let us use the notation of Cho and Kreps (1987). Let va(q, c, i) be
the expected payoff of actor a, when the delegate is of type q, sends signal c, and the population
responds with i. Let
BR(i, c) = arg max vp(q, c, i)I(q)
iE{0,1} q
be the best-response of the population, when signal c is sent and beliefs about the delegate are
4(q). Then it is clear that if (2.8) holds,
(1 if p (g)=1
BR(p, c) = if(g) = 1 (2.27)
0 if p(g) E {0, pol0 }
Therefore, there is a separating equilibrium as described in a) if and only if (2.9) holds.
Moreover, any pooling equilibrium can be sustained with appropriate off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs, for example ..(q(l) = glc) = 0, where L(q(1) = gjc) = 0 is the probability assess-
ment that the delegate is good, conditional on him sending signal c. However, they do not all
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. Let
BR(Q', c) = U{j:(Q,)=l}BR(t, c) (2.28)
for Q' C Q = {b, g} a subset of the set of types. Let vj*(q) be the equilibrium payoff of a delegate
1 of type q. Then the Intuitive Criterion reads as follows:
Definition 1 (The Intuitive Criterion. Cho and Kreps 1987, 202) For each out of equilibrium
message c, form the set S(c) of all types q such that
v*(q) > max vt(q,c,i)ieBR(Q,c)
If for message c there is some type q' E I (necessarily not in S(c)) such that
vj (q') < min vt (q',c',i)
iEBR(Q\S(c),c)
then the equilibrium is said to fail the Intuitive Criterion.
Consider a pooling equilibrium where
svIW(b,I) + (1 - s)vj(b,I) e (-Kc + vr(b, I), -Kc + vr(g,I))
Then
but
v (b) = sv (b,I) + (1 - s)vl(b,I) > max vt(b, 1,i) = -Kc + vr(b, I)
iEBR(Q,1)
v7(g) = svi. (b,I) + (1 - s)vl (b,I) < min vt(g, 1,i) = -K c + vr (g,I)iEBR({g},1)
since BR({g}, 1) = 1 by (2.28) and (2.27).
Criterion.
Therefore, this equilibrium fails the Intuitive
Now consider a pooling equilibrium where (2.29) does not hold. Then either
svys(b,I) + (1 - s)v1(b,I) < -Kc + vr(b,I)
so that S(1) = 0 and the Intuitive Criterion has no bite, or
svj, (b,I) + (1 - s)v (b,I) > -K c + vr (g, I)
so that S(1) = Q and, again, the Intuitive Criterion has no bite. m
Proof. (Proof of lemma 10). Let us solve the game by backward induction. There are two
(2.29)
equilibria of the signaling game. Equilibrium 1 has
c*(q(l) = g) = 1 4 sv,,(b,I) + (1 - s)vt(b,I) > -Kc + vr(b,I) (2.30)
c*(q(1) = b) = 0 Vs (2.31)
i*(c = 1) = l• 'svi,(b,I) + (1 - s)vz(b,I) > -K c + vr(b,I) (2.32)
i*(c = 0) = 0 (2.33)
where the population's beliefs are given using Bayes' rule along the equilibrium path, and
appropriate beliefs off the equilibrium path, if sv1 ,, (b, I) + (1 - s)v (b, I) < -Kc + vr (b, I), for
example pi(q(l) = gic = 1) = po.
Equilibrium 2 has
c*(q(l) = g) = 1 s,,v(b,I) + (1 - s)vt(b,I) -Kc + v,(b,I) (2.34)
c*(q(1) = b) = 0 Vs (2.35)
i*(c = 1) = 1 sv, ,,(b,I) + (1 - s)vt(b,I) Ž -Kc + v,(b,I) (2.36)
i*(c = 0) = 0 (2.37)
where the population's beliefs are given using Bayes' rule along the equilibrium path, and
appropriate beliefs off the equilibrium path, if sv, (b, I) + (1 - s)vt (b, I) < -Kc + vr(b, I), for
example p.(q(1) = g Ic = 1) = / o .
Moving up, the ruler solves
max -IK' + (1 - i)v,(b, I) (2.38)
s,I
anticipating the equilibrium in the signaling game. Given (2.14), then for (s, I) = (1, IU), any
equilibrium of the signaling game produces i = 0. Therefore, the ruler can implement the
unconstrained optimal level of investment. Assuming that equilibrium 1 is played, the ruler
picks
S-K c + r(b, I*)E* e [ (1 - -K ) ), 1] (2.39)1 - -Y v1 (b, I*)
I* = IU (2.40)
Assuming that equilibrium 2 is played, the ruler picks
s* 1(1 -Kc +vr (b,'I*)
s* e (1 (1 - Kc v,(bI ), 1 ] (2.41)1 - Y v1 (b, I*)
I* = I U  (2.42)
U
Proof. (Proof of lemma 11). Solving the game backwards, there are again two equilibria
of the signaling game, as given in the proof of lemma 10. Moving up, the ruler solves (2.38)
anticipating the equilibrium in the signaling game. Given (2.15), any strategy with I - IU
produces a unique outcome of the signaling game, where i = 1. However, given (2.16), then
for s = 1, I : IU, the signaling game produces a single outcome, where i = 0. Given (2.17),
the ruler strictly prefers to obtain pooling in the signaling game than to obtain a separating
equilibrium. Assuming that equilibrium 1 is played, the ruler picks
s* E [1 (1- Kc + vr(bI*) 1] (2.43)1- Y vz (b, I*)
I* # IU (2.44)
Assuming that equilibrium 2 is played, the ruler picks
1_L_ -Kc + 0r(b,I*
* e ( (1 - K+b ), 1] (2.45)
1 -- / vt (b, I*)
I* / IU (2.46)
U
Lemma 13 There is no equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion where (s*(t = 1), I) =
(0, IU),
(c*(q(l) = g),t*(q(l) = g)) = (0, 1)
i*((ct) = (0, 1)) = 0
Proof. First note that, in principle, the shuffling strategy s could be a function of the
decision t. Given that t is observable to the population, we define
BR(p, (c, t)) = arg max Y vp(q, (c, t), i)p(q)
iE{O,1}
as the best-response of the population, when the delegate picks (c, t) and beliefs about the delegate
are pi(q). Then it is clear that if (2.11) holds,
BR(i, (c, t)) = 1 if p(g) = 1 (2.47)
0 if 1(g) E {0, po}
Therefore, there is no profitable deviation from i*((c,t) = (0,1)) = 0 only if
(c*(q(1) = g), t*(q(1) = g)) = (c*(q(1) = b), t*(q(1) = b))
Write va(q, (c,t),i) as the expected payoff of actor a, when the delegate is of type q, picks
decisions (c, t), and the population responds with i. Again, let v,*(q) be the equilibrium payoff
of a delegate 1 of type q. By (2.13),
v (b) = r+ vi (b, IU) > max vi (b, (1, 1), i) =r - KC + vr(b, IU)
iEBR(Q,(1,1))
while
v7(g)=7r+vi(b,IU) < mmin vi(g,(1,1),i)= r -Kc+vr(g,IU)
iEBR({g},(1,1))
Therefore, there is no equilibrium, as described above, that survives the Intuitive Criterion. 0
Chapter 3
Divide-and-Rule and the Media
'As citizens have more precise knowledge about both the policies adopted by
politicians and the environment in which they are implemented, policy makers have
less room to divert resources to themselves.' (Adserd, Boix and Payne 2003, 448)
3.1 Introduction
How do popular divisions affect the stability of political regimes? And if rulers can directly
attenuate or exacerbate popular divisions, which policy will they choose? These are very im-
portant questions in political economy. Political institutions, by definition, arbitrate conflict to
produce collective decisions. There are many historical examples where rulers have benefited
from salient popular divisions (over such issues as the appropriate response to a foreign threat,
the fear of communism, abortion or the rights of minorities), and divide-and-rule is one of the
strategies most commonly used to implement inefficient policies (see Eggertsson 2005, chapter
5).
Yet the logic of divide and rule is not well understood. Under what circumstances will
it be used? Do rulers implement it to favor their support base or exploit it, playing on the
fear of the alternative regime? This paper presents a simple and general model to tackle such
questions. The set-up is as follows. The ruler decides a policy on a unidimensional space, sets
taxes and invests in a heterogeneity-reducing (or heterogeneity-increasing) technology. Citizens
have heterogeneous preferences on the unidimensional space. They decide whether to mount an
insurrection, after which an alternative regime implements a given vector of policy and taxes.
We show that, in equilibrium, as long as the ruler can survive with the support of a sufficiently
small group, he chooses an extremist policy, since extremists citizens are most afraid of the
alternative regime. Therefore, although the ruler appears to be favoring his support base in
the choice of his policy, he does play on their fear of the alternative regime to maximize the
rents that he can extract. By the same logic, the ruler invests in the heterogeneity-increasing
technology, so as to worsen popular divisions, maximize the fear of his own support base and
extract greater rents.
We apply this simple model to the case where the technology affecting the heterogeneity
of preferences is a manipulation of the media. The interpretation is as follows. Citizens may
initially disagree over the correct policy, but may come to an agreement with a sufficiently infor-
mative signal from the media. Therefore, with a less informative signal, individual differences
are more salient, and the ruler's support base is willing to tolerate higher rents. The model
thus offers an explanation for the negative correlation between corruption and freedom of the
media, which has been widely documented in the literature (see Ahrend 2002, Adserd, Boix
and Payne 2003, Brunetti and Weder 2003, Lederman, Loayza and Soares 2005).
We then consider a couple of extensions. First, we show that the results of the model are
robust to the case where the ruler can impose different taxes on supporters and opponents.
Although the ruler imposes lower taxes on his supporters and picks the policy preferred by
his marginal supporter, he still invests in the heterogeneity-increasing so as to exploit his own
support base, maximizing its fear of the alternative regime. Second, we ask whether this
investment in heterogeneity-increasing technology is a complementary or a substitute strategy
to repression. We show that it is a complementary strategy, when repression reduces the size of
the minimal support base for the ruler, but that it is an independent strategy, when repression
increases the cost of mounting an insurrection.
Let me say a few words about how the paper connects to the literature. First, it is related to
the literature on politics in plural societies. For example, Dahl (1971), Rabushka and Shepsle
(1972) and Horowitz (2000) warn of the dangers of cleavages in democratic stability, while
Fearon and Laitin (1996) show that inter-ethnic conflicts are on the whole relatively rare (see
also Cederman and Girardin 2007 and Fearon et al. 2007). In democratic settings, scholars
have debated whether the optimal strategy for politicians is to favor their support base (Cox
and McCubbins 1986) or attract the support of pivotal voters (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987,
Dixit and Londregan 1996). In weakly institutionalized settings, different models of divide and
rule have been proposed (Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier 2004, Padro-i-Miquel 2006, see also
Weingast 1997 and Perez 2004). For example, Padro-i-Miquel (2006) stresses the idea that a
ruler exploits own support base with a divide-and-rule strategy. In his model, divisions among
the population are exogenously-given along ethnic lines: a particular ethnic group tolerates
high taxes and corruptions from their own kin, afraid of what would happen were the ruler to
be replaced by a member of the other ethnic group. In our model, divisions in the population
are determined endogenously by a decision of the ruler.
Focusing on this divide-and-rule strategy produces a very different result from Alesina and
Spolaore (2003), who use a very similar set-up, but instead conclude that the ruler should be
centrist and invest in the heterogeneity-reducing technology. This different conclusion comes
from the fact that, in their model, the outside option is exogenous, while in our model it
is endogenous. We argue that our assumption is sensible. For example, a good signal from
the media fixes the state of knowledge, and thereby the consequence of any policy, whether
implemented by the ruler or the alternative regime.
The paper is also related to a large literature on the importance of free media for democracy
and accountability (see e.g. Lichtenberg 1987, Lichtenberg 1990, O'Neil 1998, Gunther and
Mughan 2000, Kalathil and Boas 2003). For example, Lichtenberg (1987), following the work
of Alexander Meiklejohn, identifies two main functions of the media as a pillar of democracy
and responsible government. First, it serves an informative function in that it allows citizens
to make informed decisions and it helps political leaders stay connected with their constituents'
interests. Second, it serves a critical function in that it represents the people's watchdog against
government abuse. Several recent studies fall into these categories. Following an informative
rationale, Besley and Burgess (2002) find evidence in a case study in India that a more informed
and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for the government to be responsive to
the citizens. Also, Stromberg (2004a) finds that U. S. counties with many radio listeners received
more relief funds during the New Deal era. Stromberg (2004b) argues that mass media forces
the government to bias policy toward larger constituencies. For the critical rationale, Besley
and Prat (2006) develop a model where media can detect the type of a government (corrupt or
not). With more independent media outlets, the cost to capture the media market is higher.
The current paper blends those two functions in the following way. First, the message of the
media is about the state of the world, which allows for an informed decision. Second, precise
information checks government abuses in that it reduces the disagreement in the population,
and therefore the willingness of the ruler's support base to tolerate rents.
Other papers have focused on the role of information as helping citizens to coordinate
an attack against a government (see Lohmann 1994, Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan 2004 and
Edmond 2005). We see the current paper as complementary to their work, as we abstract from
coordination problems. Note, though, that our model offers an explanation for the negative
correlation between freedom of the media and corruption, which is consistent with common
knowledge about the corruption of a government (whereas coordination games typically exhibit
multiple equilibria, when the type of the government is common knowledge).
Our paper instead focuses on the political divisions within the population, and how they
affect the ruler's incentive to manipulate information. In that regard, it is related to Banerjee
and Somanathan (2001), who instead study how the configuration of preferences of groups and
their leader can elicit voice from an informed member. Let us now flesh out the set-up of the
baseline model.
3.2 The Baseline Model
Consider an economy where there is a continuum of citizens of mass 1 and a ruler r. Citizens
pay taxes and derive utility from a policy decision. The utility of agent i with bliss point i and
policy (tc, l) is
u(tc, Ic) = y - t- a(c )2  (3.1)
where y is the income of the citizen (Yi = y Vi). In other words, taxes enter linearly in the
utility function, and the utility derived from the policy follows a standard quadratic loss function
(a> 0).
A key feature of the set-up is that citizens differ in their ideal point li. We leave the nature
of this heterogeneity to be fairly general. We allow for an aggregate shock z to the preferences
and for uncertainty about the state of the world It . We simply impose that any shock z is
order-preserving (ie li = abi + / for a > 0, where bi is an individual parameter, which follows
a distribution F in the population and F is invertible).
The ruler initially in power suggests a tax and policy decision (t', i') and invests m in a
technology M which affects the heterogeneity of preferences (m > 0). Let us focus on cases
where M has a monotonic impact on the heterogeneity of preferences. We will say that:
Definition 2 The technology M is heterogeneity-increasing if Vli lrVm
a(l - 14)2 > 00
Om




In other words, the technology is heterogeneity-increasing(-reducing) if it increases(reduces)
the 'effective distance' between the ideal point of citizens and the policy of the ruler. Given the
parameters of the model, we allow a, a and 3 to depend on m. To make matters a little more
concrete, we can think of the following examples as special cases of the general model:
Example 1 Alesina and Spolaore (2003)
In this set-up, citizens differ in their bias (li = bi) and there is no uncertainty about the
state of the world It (z = lt). However, the ruler can affect the importance of individual
differences through an investment in M (ie a is a (monotonic) function of m). 1
Example 2 Normal Learning Model
Let lt be the true state of the world, which directly informs the correct policy (say, 1t is a
measure of the extent of a foreign threat). Citizens would like the policy to match their
expectation of the state of the world (li = E[lt]). They initially disagree about the state
'One interpretation could be that I1 is the location of a 'center of modernity' and M corresponds to the road
infrastructure, where citizens incur a cost to accessing public goods.
of the world, where individual i believes that
it i N bj, (3.2)ho,
The signal z is an unbiased report on the state of the world, z = lt+E and s - N(0, )
where the precision of the signal can be manipulated by the ruler. Upon receiving the
signal z, individual i believes that
t (hobi + he(m)z 1 (3.3)
Sho + h,(m) ' ho + he (m)
In other words, citizens have their own prior, agree to disagree, but can be convinced
to revise their position if they observe a public and unbiased signal about the true state
of the world. The relative weight that they put on this public signal is a function of
the precision of the signal (h,(m)), which the ruler can manipulate. Translating into the
notation from the general set-up, we have li = a(m)bi + 3(m), where ca(m) = h
and O(m) = hoh0(m)" We also assume, for simplicity, that a'(m) = 0.
The goal of the ruler is to maximize the collection of taxes and remain in power. Let his
utility be
R = wt - C(m)
where C(m) is the cost of investing m, with C(m), C'(m), C"(m) > 0 and w is an indicator
function equal to 1 if and only if the ruler stays in power.
The ruler stays in power if a fraction 5 of the population supports him (6 e [0, 1]). If he does
not gather this support, he is replaced by what is called an 'insurrection'. Here, the language
is particularly appropriate where for replacements done through extra-legal means, but it can
also apply to cases where replacement is done within the confines of the law. This is the case
if a ruler faces elections, but he is able to rig them more or less freely, depending on 6, and it
is costly for citizens to uncover fraud and impose free and fair elections. Let us assume that,
after a ruler is deposed, an alternative regime is set up and implements a policy (t', l). Let the
decision to mount an insurrection be captured by the variable si (where si = 1 means that the
citizen participates in the insurrection). We abstract from the problem of collective action and
assume that citizens decide as a block on whether to mount an insurrection. In other words,
si = 9 Vi and = 0 4• fs dF > 6, where
S = {i ui(tC, Ic) - ui(to, l1) > -c} (3.4)
and c is the cost of mounting an insurrection. We assume that (to, l') is selected by some
general mechanism, where 10 = abo + / for some bo.2
Let us specify the timing of the game and equilibrium concept before we solve the model.
3.2.1 Timing of the Game
* The ruler picks a policy (t r , r, m). m is implemented.
* Signal z is publicly observed.
* Citizen i chooses si.
* Payoffs are realized.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Concept
The model solves for a subgame-perfect equilibrium, which is a vector of strategies {tr, 1 r , m}
for the ruler and {si} for each citizen i. In particular, we let the ruler propose a tax rate tr and
policy Ir which are functions of the signal z.
3.3 Solution of the Baseline Model
The following lemmas present the solution to the model:
Lemma 14 -ByVy > - Vm, the optimal tax and policy vector (tr, lr ) is given by:
tr = to + a(lr - lo) 2 + c (3.5)
2A previous version of the paper solves for (t', 1) in the case of a regime of 'direct self-rule', where all citizens
vote first on t' and then on l1.
= 10 if 6 Ž max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}
Ir - lF-1(1-) if F(bo) _ 6 < 1 - F(bo) (3.6)
1- F-1(6) if 1 - F(bo) • 6 < F(bo)
E argmaxjE{F-1(J),F-1(1_))}(lj - lo)2 if 6 < min{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}
where 1F-1(s) = li for i such that bi = F-1(x).
Proof. See the appendix. m
This lemma says that the ruler always picks extreme citizens as his support base. Indeed,
given the convexity of the loss function (02a(1c•-z02
given the convexity of th  loss function > 0), they have the most to lose from the
implementation of the alternative regime, and they are willing to tolerate the highest rents. If
the ruler must please too large a coalition, then he is forced to offer the same policy as that
of the alternative regime, since any move away from it reduces the willingness to pay of the
marginal supporter.
Also, the ruler can manipulate the distance between the ideal point of his supporters and
the policy of the alternative regime. Solving for m, we can show the following lemma:
Lemma 15 3-jVy > -, the ruler invests in M if and only if 6 < max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)} and
M is heterogeneity-increasing.
Proof. See the appendix. m
Lemma 15 states that the ruler invests in M so as to maximally differentiate his policy
from that of the alternative regime, which is possible only if institutions are sufficiently weak
(6 < max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}). Note that, by increasing the distance between his policy and the
policy of the alternative regime, the ruler also increases the distance between his policy and
the ideal point of all citizens (except his marginal supporter, ie j such that Ir = lj). In other
words, the ruler actually has an incentive to reduce the utility of the citizens in his regime,
which allows him to extract more rents. The reason is that the ruler already offers the ideal
point of his marginal supporter. To increase this supporter's willingness to pay, the ruler must
depress his utility under the alternative regime. Note that, ironically, the ruler's support base
rewards him with higher taxes for increasing the distance between his policy and that of the
alternative regime. Yet if the ruler did not invest in M, his support base would not be so afraid
of the alternative regime!
Now we can take comparative statics with respect to the ex ante heterogeneity of biases and
other parameters of the model. To ensure the existence of an interior solution, let us impose
2a(r(m)2 < 0 Vm > 0, so that the marginal impact of an investment in M is decreasing.
Also let us define parameters Pa and Pc such that a(m(m)2 0 and Vm > 0, a nmpa > 0,
> 0. In words, the total and marginal benefit of investing in M are monotonically
increasing in Pa and the marginal cost of investing in the heterogeneity-increasing technology
is monotonically increasing in Pc. Then we get
Corollary 1 VJ > max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}, - = *= 0 for x E {6, (bj - bo) 2 , Pa, Pc} and
VJ < max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}
dtr
-- < 0 9m*<0
d(bj -bo)2 > 0 0(b-bo) 2 > 0
dtr 0 > 0dp>0 >0
dtr < 0 om* < 0dpc < Pc
Proof. See the appendix. m
Corollary 1 says that, whenever the ruler uses the divide-and-rule strategy, he is hurt by
a stronger institutional constraint, extracting lower levels of rent ( < 0) and investing less
in the heterogeneity-increasing technology (- < 0). Also, the ruler benefits from greater
heterogeneity of biases bi. In this case, his marginal supporter is more afraid of the alternative
regime. He is willing to tolerate higher taxes, for any level of m, and is also more affected
by any investment in M. Likewise, any increase in the effectiveness of the heterogeneity-
increasing technology (Pa) directly benefits the ruler and also increases the incentives to invest
in M. Finally, any increase in the cost of investment (Pc) reduces the incentive to invest in M,
which then reduces the taxes that the ruler can extract. Taken together, these comparative
statics imply that we should observe a positive correlation between taxes and investment in
heterogeneity-increasing technology, as we change one set of parameters of the model.
Taking stock, we can interpret the model in light of our two leading examples.
Example 1 (Continued) Alesina and Spolaore (2003)
Lemma 15 states that the ruler of a weakly institutionalized country chooses an extremist
position and invests in heterogeneity-increasing technology. Note that the model offers
a different conclusion from Alesina and Spolaore (2003), who nevertheless use a similar
set-up. The difference comes from the fact that, in their model, the alternative regime
brings a constant level of utility uO to all citizens. Therefore, the ruler should maximize
the utility of citizens in his regime and invest in heterogeneity-reducing technology. We
believe that our assumption is realistic, if M represents the manipulation of the media,
which fixes the state of knowledge in any regime. 3
Example 2 (Continued) Normal Learning Model
Lemma 15 and corollary 1 state that the ruler has an incentive to obstruct the media (if
Ohm < 0), and that we should observe a negative relationship between rents and free-
dom of the media. In particular, this negative relationship obtains as we vary ho, since
a(m) > 0 and 2a() > 0 Vm h, limm-+ e(m) > ho. In other words, populations with
stronger priors (ho) tolerate higher levels of taxes and invite the ruler to invest more in the
heterogeneity-increasing technology. This negative relationship between corruption and
freedom of the media has been widely documented in the literature (see Ahrend 2002;
Adsera, Boix and Payne 2003; Brunetti and Weder 2003; Lederman, Loayza and Soares
2005). While other explanations have been put forward, ours is consistent with the level
of corruption being common knowledge. It focuses on the possible divisions that exist
in the population, which can be attenuated when there is precise and credible evidence
about the correct policy to adopt. 4
3As mentioned, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) also suggest to interpret the model as a physical distance between
individuals and government services, which can be affected by an investment in roads. In that case, though, we
can tentatively refer to some evidence that the rulers of weakly institutionalized countries, say in post-colonial
Africa, invested little in roads, especially if the territory they governed had areas of high population density that
were distant from one another (see Collier and Gunning 1999, 71 and Herbst 2000, 166). Moreover, there is
also some evidence that public good provision tends to be concentrated in support areas (where rulers such as
Mobutu and Houphouet-Boigny are notorious for such a strategy). Certainly, other explanations can be offered
for this low investment in roads, for example if they disproportionately favor the insurgents (Robinson 2001).4 For an alternative approach, using global games methods, see Edmond (2005) and Angeletos, Hellwig and
Pavan (2006). These papers focus on the coordination of citizens to attack a regime, where citizens get private
and public signals about the type of a regime. This set-up, however, ignores any division within the population
on policy grounds.
3.4 Extensions
We now present two extensions to the main model. First, we allow the ruler to impose different
tax rates. We show that, although the ruler favors his support base with lower taxes, he still
invests in the heterogeneity-increasing technology, so as to exploit their fear of the alternative
regime. Second, we ask whether the investment in heterogeneity-increasing technology is a
complementary strategy to repression. We show that it is, when repression reduces the size of
the minimal support base (6), but not when it increases the cost of mounting an insurrection
(c).
3.4.1 Divide-and-Rule and Discrimination
Let the modified set-up be as follows: the ruler can set two different tax rates, one for supporters,
trr
tr, and another for opponents, t'.. In that case, we can show the following lemma:
Lemma 16 -ByVy > - Vm, the optimal tax and policy vector (t,8 , tr, lr) is tr, = y, tr = t r
as given in (3.5) and Ir as given in (3.6). Moreover, the optimal level of investment m* is as
given in the baseline model.
Proof. See the appendix. m
This proposition states that the policy chosen and the level of taxes on the supporters are
the same as in the baseline model. This comes from the fact that, for any policy Ir, there is a
unique ordering of citizens in terms of their willingness to pay. Therefore, the ruler picks the
same extreme citizens as his support base, and sets maximal taxes on his opponents. Because
the equilibrium policy is the same, the benefit of investing in M is unchanged and we obtain
the same comparative statics. Therefore, the model can be extended to the case where the ruler
sets different tax rates on different groups of citizens. He appears to be favoring his support
base, in that they face lower taxes. Yet the media is still used as a divide-and-rule mechanism,
so as to instill fear among his support base and maximize its willingness to pay.5
s Note that Kasara (2007) suggests that a ruler might in fact impose higher taxes on the agricultural products
of their own supporters, suggesting information asymmetries on the optimal way to tax different groups.
3.4.2 Divide-and-Rule and Repression
Let us now allow the ruler to repress the population. First, assume that the ruler can set 6
at cost C(6), with C'(6) < 0, C"(6) > 0. In other words, it is costly for the ruler to decrease
6, and the marginal cost of lifting the institutional constraint (reducing 6) is increasing. Let
us also assume that the distribution of biases F is such that a2(- - b, )2 < 0 (so as to satisfy
the second-order condition). Also, let us index the set of cost functions C(6) by a parameter
p6, such that c() < 0, i.e. the marginal cost of repression is monotonically increasing in p6.
Then we have
Lemma 17 VJ < max{F(bo), 1- F(bo)}
02Rre*0* < 0 (3.7)Om*86*
dtr < 0 Om* < 0 > 0 (3.8)dp"6 0 , OP 0 6-
Proof. See the appendix. m
The inequality (3.7) states that investment in heterogeneity-increasing technology and re-
pression are complementary strategies, when repression decreases the size of the minimal sup-
port base for the ruler. Since, with greater repression, the ruler's support base is more extreme,
and therefore more afraid of the alternative regime, then the ruler gains more in investing in
heterogeneity-increasing technology. The inequalities in (3.8) state that we should expect a
positive correlation between rents and investment in heterogeneity-increasing technology, and
a negative correlation between rents and the strength of institutional constraint (if the latter is
endogenous), when countries differ by the cost of repression.
Now let us allow the ruler to repress by increasing the cost of insurrection c at cost C(c),
with C'(c) > 0, C"(c) > 0. In other words, it is costly for the ruler to increase c, and the
marginal cost of increasing the cost of insurrection is increasing. Also, let us index the set of
cost functions C(c) by a parameter pc, such that 0c'(c) > 0, i.e. the marginal cost of repression
is monotonically incre sing in pc Then we haveis monotonically increasing in p,. Then we have
Lemma 18 V6 < max{F(bo), 1- F(bo)}
02R
= 0 (3.9)8m * c*
dtr < * = 0 < 0 (3.10)dp- OTe 0 c
Proof. See the appendix. m
This lemma states that investment in heterogeneity-increasing technology and repression
are independent strategies, when repression increases the cost of insurrection. The reason is
that the cost of repression is a fixed value, independent of the divisions among the population.
Therefore, we should not expect any relationship between rents and investment in heterogeneity-
increasing technology, but a positive relationship between rents and the cost of insurrection (if
the latter is endogenous), when countries differ by the cost of repression.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple and general model where a ruler manipulates popular divisions
so as to extract the maximum level of rents and remain in power. The major results are
the following. First, the ruler relies on an extreme support base, which has most to lose if
the ruler is replaced. Second, the ruler invests in heterogeneity-increasing technology so as to
exploit his own support base. We show that the model accounts for the negative correlation
between freedom of the media and corruption, as documented by many studies, an explanation
which is consistent with widespread awareness (in fact, common knowledge) of corruption in
the population.
There are natural extensions to this paper. For one, citizens might tolerate high levels of
corruption because of a coordination failure, a problem which was assumed away here. It would
be interesting to study this question, and combine the approach with the mechanism outlined
in global games methods (e.g. Edmond 2005). Another extension would be to develop a richer
model of the media. Here, it is represented as a single entity providing an unbiased signal
about the state of the world. This could come about as the result of a 'competition of ideas',
where an open consideration of many viewpoints leads to an unbiased, and more or less precise,
assessment of the truth. It would be interesting, though, to spell out this mechanism, and
combine our approach with models of media bias in competitive markets (e.g. Mullainathan
and Shleifer 2005, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Finally, it would be interesting to write a
complete model of propaganda using this set-up, a process which generally exalts the success
of the ruler while sending terrifying signals about the alternative regime (Zeman 1964).
3.6 Appendix
Proof. (Proof of lemma 14). Note that i E S if and only if
y - tr - a(lr - li)2 > y - to - a(1o - )2 - C
+ tr < t m ax -= to + a(lo - 14)2 - a(Ir - i)2 + c (3.11)
Let us fix y such that Vilr,lo, tmax < V so that we solve for an interior solution. Then note that
0tm ax  Oa(lo - li) 2  Oa(1r _ 1i) 2
I-> 0 > 10= < Ir (3.12)
'
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by the strict convexity of a(1c - l)2 in (ic- 4). Therefore, we can nicely order citizens in terms
of their willingness to pay for Ir and avoid 10.
The program for the ruler becomes max tr,l ,mtr s.t.
tr < max tmax  (3.13)
where t max  i hr-adfrta
-where () is short-hand for t", where j is such that bj - F-1(x). By the strict convexity
of a(l - 14)2 in jr and the fact that it attains a minimum at ir = li, we have
tmax < >
1 = 0>ý*1 = li (3.14)
air > <
Therefore, the solution is given by (3.5), (3.6) Vm. *
Proof. (Proof of lemma 15). The program of the ruler is maxm R = t r - C(m) subject to
(3.5) and (3.6). It is clear that the ruler invests in M if and only if 6 < max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}.
The ruler strictly invests if M is heterogeneity-increasing since
OR
5ilm=o
Oa(lr - li)2 > 0
Om
while he does not invest if M is heterogeneity-reducing since Vm
OR =a(r 
_ 1)2- C'(m) < 0
Om Om
Proof. (Proof of corollary 1). Assume that 6 > max{F(bo), 1-F(bo)}, then - = =0.*
If 6 < max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}, then m* is given by
OR
Om*
Da(m *)oa(m *)2 2Oa(m*)c(m)[bj 
- bo] - CI(m*) = 0
Om*
with aa(m*)a(m*)2 ction theorem,with a (m* > 0. Also, by the implicit fun











since =tr  C'(m*) > 0, ' < 0, = a(m*)a (m*)2[bbo2 < 0. The comparative statics
on (bj - bo) 2 , Pa, Pc follow from the same arguments. *
Proof. (Proof of lemma 16). The program for the ruler is the program reads as follows:
(3.16)
s.t. fs dF > 6. It is clear that tr = y is optimal. Now consider the group of supporters. Note
that i E S if and only if tr < t max, where tmf' is as defined in (3.11). (3.12) still holds, so that
tr = tr is as given in (3.5) and Ir is as given in (3.6). m
(3.15)
max trf dF + tr [1- dF] - C(m )
{ts ,t rn , l
,mlr
Proof. (Proof of lemma 17). The optimal m and 6 are given by
maxR = tr - C(m) - C(6)
m,6
= to + c + a(m)a(m)2[bj - bo] 2 - C(m) - C()





- Orem~* )2[bj - bo] 2 - C'(m*) = 0
am*
OR a(m)a(m)2[bj - bo]2
= a(m*)-(m*)2 6 - C'(6*) = 0
It is clear that
2 2R
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Omr* 06*



















2 R 0 2 R
Om*Op6 m*06*
0 2 R 0 2 R
*<0
0 2 R 0 2 R
e•-* 0m*06*
02 R 02 R
am*86*
a2R






















+ a(m*)a(m*)2 <[b0 - bo] 2 9 06* ap <
Proof. (Proof of lemma 18). The optimal m and c are given by
maxR
m,c
= tr - C(m) - C(c)
= to + c + a(m)a(m)2 [bj - bo]2 - C(m) - C(c)
VJ < max{F(bo), 1 - F(bo)}, bi : bo, and the solution is given by the first-order conditions:
OR
Om*
Ba(m*)a(m*)2 2m* [bj - bo  -
OR
ROc*S7 =1 - C'(c*) = 0
82 R
It is clear that -= p = 0, so that = , = -
amsac*~~~ "P - ,s0ta2R - _ 8C* 2
dtr Otr 9m*
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